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Article 9

ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS: DO STATE DEPARTMENT
ADVISORY OPINIONS VIOLATE REFUGEES'
RIGHTS AND U.S. INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS?
RICHARD

I.

K.

PRESTON*

INTRODUCTION

Over 16,622 applications for political asylum in the United
States were filed during fiscal year 1985'-more than four times the
number that were filed in 1978.2 At the end of fiscal year 1985,
126,000 other applications were still pending.
A successful applicant must meet the burden of demonstrating
a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to his or her home
country.3 However, before an adjudicating officer can determine
whether an applicant has met that burden, the officer must send the
application to the State Department for its opinion.4 The brief conclusory opinion of the State Department is often dispositive of the
entire application because many adjudicating officers give great deference to the opinion and rarely rule against its conclusions. 5 The
introduction of advisory opinions into the asylum decisionmaking
process permits political considerations that are irrelevant to the
merits of a particular application to play a persuasive role. The issue addressed here is whether this procedure violates the refugee's
* J.D. 1985, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. STATISTICS Div., IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV. (INS), Asylum Cases
Filed with District Directors, Table dated Oct. 23, 1985. Figures are based on asylum
cases filed with district directors since October 1984. The figures represent only the
number of applications filed, not the number of individuals seeking asylum since an
applicant can file for his/her spouse and children.
2. Id. For breakdown by year, see TABLE 1, infra text accompanying note 172.
The number of applications has declined markedly since 1981 as the massive Cuban
influx of that year gets processed.
3. 8 C.F.R. § 208.5 (1985). See generally Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States
Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 539, 547-55 (1981) (discussing the applicant's burden of proof and the various types of evidence upon which decisions are based).
4. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1985).
5. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONs: AN EVOLVING CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

62 ([une 1982) [hereinafter cited as INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS] (copy available from
the author). One INS official remarked: "I would never, never overrule the State Department." Id. However, comments from other officials were more critical of the State
Department. For further discussion, see supra notes 209-238 and accompanying text.
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right to have an asylum claim fairly considered and United States
treaty obligations not to return a refugee to a country where his or
her life or freedom would be threatened.
Traditionally, the United States has welcomed those fleeing
persecution in their homelands. Since America is a nation of immigrants, many of whom have fled religious and political persecutions,
this tradition is firmly embedded in the American character.' Even
with the enactment of the first immigration laws, Congress made
exceptions for otherwise deportable aliens who would be persecuted for political opinions if returned.7
The passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 (Act)' reaffirmed the
American tradition of embracing those who face persecution at
home. The Act established a procedure for applying for asylum')
and adopted a new definition of "refugee,' ' l eliminating the statutory bias favoring those fleeing Communist countries." The Act
was also intended to bring United States law into conformity with
international treaty obligations under the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).' 2
However, after the Act's passage the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was inundated with applications for asylum. It
was expected that there would be only 5,000 asylum applications
6. Since 1776, the United States has admitted approximately 50,000,000 immigrants, of which 2,000,000 were characterized as refugees. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW & POLICY 1952-1979, at 15-25 (1979); S. REP. No.
256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477; Act of Aug. 3, 1882,
ch. 376, § 4, 22 Stat. 214, 214; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1804, 1804: Act
of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3,
39 Stat. 874, 877. The current provision is found in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, § 243(h) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
8. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(1982)).
9. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158 (1982)).
10. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102-03 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ I101(a)(42) (1982)).
l1. See Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911,913 (1965), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96212, §203(b)(5), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980). Previously, refugees gained admittance
through the seventh preference, conditional entry, if aliens could demonstrate that "because of persecution . . .on account of race, religion or political opinion they have lied
(I) from any Communist country or Communist-dominated county or area. or (II) friom
any country within the general area of the Middle East ....
See aso infra notes 43-49
and accompanying text.
12. United National Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor sunatlure
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 622, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 Ihereinafter cited as
Protocol]. The Protocol was ratified by the United States on Oct. 4. 1968. 114 CoG.
Ri.:C. 29.607 (1968).
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each year,': and in 1979 only 5,801 applications were filed.'" By
contrast, sixteen months after the Act took effect, 53,000 applications had been filed.' 5 Marielitos fleeing Cuba accounted for the
bulk of the surge in applications. Refugees from recent events in
Poland, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Lebanon, and
Afghanistan, along with those from continuing repression and economic malaise in Haiti and Guatemala, also contributed to the surge
and, together with the Cubans, account for ninety percent of the
pending applications. 16 By October 1983 there were 165,998 applications pending.' 7
The political response to this surge affected the implementation
of the Act's facially neutral definition of "refugee" and led to objectionable executive policies designed to thwart the flow of refugees
from certain countries. A few examples illustrate this point. First,
by Presidential proclamation, the United States began an interdiction program allowing the Coast Guard to intercept and board certain vessels to determine whether those vessels contained
undocumented aliens bound for the United States.' 8 Though the
undocumented aliens that enter by sea are predominantly Cubans
and Haitians, this program only affected Haitians since Haiti is the
only country that has agreed to accept those interdicted.' Second,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL RE& NATURALIZATION 9 (1978). Section 209(b) of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982) provides that only 5,000 asylees can adjust their
status to permanent residents in any given year after residing in the country for one
year. Though these provisions do not limit the number that can be granted asylum
status, they do indicate what was thought would be the ordinary number of asylum
petitioners.
14. INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 18. (In 1978 only 3,702 asylum
applications were filed. Id.) See also TABLE 1, infra text accompanying note 170.
15. See TABLE 1, nfa text accompanying note 172.
16. Percentages were derived by the author using data from Asylum Cases Filed with
District Directors, FY 1983, STATISTICS Div., INS.
17. Id.
18. Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48.107 (1981); Exec. Order 12,324, 46
Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981). In 1984, 2,501 Haitians were returned under the interdiction
program. This represented 73% of all the Haitians returned since interdiction was
started in 1981. See U.S. )EP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1984, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (Jt. Comm. Print 1985) 574.
13. See

IMMIGRATION

&

NATURALIZATION SERV.,

PORT OF THE COMM'R OF IMMIGRATION

19. See

REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION

&

NATIONAI.TY LAw OF TUE ASS'N OF

HiIE BAR OF -rIE CITY OF NEW YORK, TIHE FUTURE OF POI.TICAI. ASYLTM IN TIlE UNITED
STATES 7 (April 1984) Ihereinafter cited as REPORT, FUTURE OF POLITICAL. ASYLuM I (cit-

ing diplomatic letters dated September 23, 1981, exchanged between the governents
of the United States and Haiti) (copy of the report available from (he author). For the
international law implications of the interdiction program, see Sohn, Iiteidiction ?I Vessels
on the H gh Seas, 18 INT'L LAW. 411 (1984).
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the Attorney General has implemented an alien detention policy 0
that allows him to detain certain undocumented aliens, initially just
Haitians, 2 ' indefinitely without possibility of parole, in contrast to
past procedures applied to aliens not likely to abscond or pose security risks. 2 This policy is intended to discourage other aliens
from coming to the United States and claiming asylum, since such
action results in virtual imprisonment. 2 ' Third, discretionary application of the extended voluntary departure status to Poles and not
to Salvadorans, though the civil strife in El Salvador appears to be
worse than that in Poland, evidences a political motivation behind
the decision. 4
Many have charged that political considerations work their way
not only into the general policy decisions described above, but also
into the individual State Department advisory opinions.2 5 This criticism is supported by the fact that aliens applying for asylum from
20. 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5, 235.3 (1985). For an extensive discussion on the legal impact
of the new policy, see Levy, Detention in theAsylum Context, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 297 (1983).
21. The policy was challenged as discriminatory since it was initially applied only to
Haitians. See Vigile v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nor. Bertrand v.
Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982); see also REPORT, FUTURE OF POLITICAL ASYLUM, supra

note 19, at 8;

FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN NEW YORK: LAW, POLICY, AND

25-26 [hereinafter cited as FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL
(Apr. 1984) (Occasional Papers No. 41, sponsored by the New York Research
Program in Inter-American Affairs at New York University) (available from the author).
22. Before the new detention policy went into effect, it was customary practice to
parole aliens awaiting a determination of their claims. In 1958 the Supreme Court approved of this practice, stating:
The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which needless confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted. . . . [Pihysical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule,
and is generally employed only as to security risks or those likely to abscond.
. . . Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an enlightened
civilization.
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
23. A new detention center in Oakdale, Louisiana will greatly increase the ability of
INS to detain large numbers of aliens. Arthur Helton, Director of the Political Asylum
Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, charges that the result of the
detention policy is that "many people who would deserve asylum do not even try to
reach our shores. Others, equally deserving, are encouraged to leave and return to
places where they face persecution." N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1986, at A27, col. 3.
24. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502
(D.D.C. 1984) (upholding the Attorney General's decision not to grant extended volunADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
ASYLUM]

tary departure to Salvadorans);

FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM,

supra note 21,

at 43-46.

25. See

FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM,

supra note 21, at 56; Scanlan, Il'ho is

a Refugee? Proceduresand Burden of Proof Under the Refugee Act of 1980, in 5 IN DEFENSE OF
THE ALIEN 23, 27-31 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Scanlan, lWho isa Refugee?]; REPORT,
FUTURE OF POLITICAL ASYLUM, supra note 19, at 4-6; Aleinikoff, Time for Reform, 29 LAW
QUADRANGLE NOTES-U. MICH. L. SCH. 20, 23-24 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Aleinikoff,
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countries friendly to the United States or countries with whom the
United States has a strong interest in maintaining good relations are
less successful than aliens fleeing Communist countries. 2"6 It appears that certain nationals are more likely than others to obtain
asylum simply because the State Department wishes to avoid having
to recognize important friendly nations as human rights abusers,

while it gains political mileage by granting asylum to refugees from
Communist countries.
This article will examine the problems inherent in the use of

State Department advisory opinions in asylum adjudications, and
will propose some alternative procedures that would enable INS officers and immigration judges to use the vast resources of the State

Department without sacrificing fairness to the individual applicant.
Before examining those problems, however, it is necessary to examine briefly the history of United States asylum law to put the current procedures for obtaining asylum into context.
II.

POST-WAR REFUGEE LAW

The right to asylum emerged out of an uneven, though discernible, movement toward addressing the serious international
problems that have stemmed from the large number of refugees
fleeing persecution since the end of the Second World War.2 7 Immediately after the war, millions of displaced persons were either
Time for Reform]; Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1125, 1132-33 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Right of Asylum]; Helton, Second-Class
Refugees, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1985, at A27, col 2.
26. See infra notes 172-176 and accompanying text; see also Helton, Political Asylum
Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 253-54
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Helton, An Unfulfilled Promise], (citing 1983 INS statistics
showing that from Communist-dominated countries, 78% of the Russians, 64% of the
Ethiopians, 53% of the Afghans, and 44% of the Romanians received asylum, while less
than 11% of the Filippinos, 14% of the Pakistani, 2% of the Haitians, 2% of the
Guatemalans, and 3% of the Salvadorans received asylum). These rates have not
changed significantly, as is evidenced in the FY 1985 statistics. See TABLE 2, infra text
accompanying note 173.
27. See also Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises Since World 1l'ar II and the Response of the
International Community, 1982 MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEGAL STUD. 3 [hereinafter cited as
Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises]; see generally Anker & Posner, The Fort,- 'earCrisis: .4 Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981) (analysis of U.S.
legal response to refugee and asylum policy issues in the post-World War II period);
Evans, The PoliticalRefugee in the United States Immigration Law and Practice,3 INT'L LAW. 204
(1969) (a discussion of the history of general asylum law and policy); Martin, The Refugee
Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91 [hereinafter
cited as Martin, Refugee Act]; (developmental analysis of key provisions of the Refugee
Act); Speer, America's Post-War Refugee Measures: A Sketch of Executive and Legislative .ction,
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unwilling or unable to return to their homelands.2'8 Numerous international organizations were established to coordinate the resettlement of refugees from Europe and elsewhere.2 ' The United
States, Canada, Australia, and Brazil permitted hundreds of
thousands to immigrate from the European refugee camps. In the
United States, domestic legislation modified immigration procedures to cope with the tide. The Displaced Persons Act of 194830
enabled up to 202,000 qualifying refugees to immigrate. 3 ' The International Refugee Organization (IRO) succeeded in resettling
1,038,000 people before it was dissolved in 1951.32
With the emergence of Cold War politics came a significant
change in the character of the European refugee situation. Refugees from Eastern Europe posed special problems as they accumulated in the border areas of Western European countries,
aggravating already poor East-West relations. In 1950 the United
Nations General Assembly passed a resolution creating the Office of
the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), responsible for the
protection of refugees who could not count on their nations of origin for protection.3 3 In 1951 the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention) 34 established a durable
4 INT'L LAw. 709 (1970) (comprehensive summary of postwar and ad hoc refugee programs). For prewar history of refugees in the international community, see Hathaway,
The Evolution of Refugee Status in InternationalLaw: 1920-1950, 33 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 348
(1985) (tracing development of pre-Convention definitions of refugees).
28. Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises, supra note 27, at 5-9.
29. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), UNRRA
Agreement, Nov. 9, 1943, 57 Stat. 1164, E.A.S. 352; the International Refugee Organization (IRO), Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, T.I.A.S. No. 1846, 18 U.N.T.S. 3; United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA),
G.A. Res. 302, U.N. Doc. A/1251 (1949); Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) 46, U.N.
Doc. A/1775 (1950).
30. Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
31. Id. § 3. All persons were required to meet the immigration requirements imposed by the 1924 Immigration Act and to be unable to return home because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion. Though
the original act was quite limited in who could qualify because the priority scheme of the
1924 Act did not treat all Europeans equally, subsequent amendments to the Act permitted more to enter. See Act ofJune 16, 1950, ch. 262, § 4, 64 Stat. 219; Act ofJune 28,
1951, ch. 167, § 1, 65 Stat. 96.
32. See IRO, supra note 28; Carlin, Significant Refugee Crises, supra note 27, at 6.
33. See UNHCR, supra note 29.
34. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The Convention was
adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, held in Geneva from July 2 to July 25, 1951, and entered
into force on April 22, 1954.
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definition of a refugee, though the Convention applied only to those
displaced as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951. It
defined a refugee as a person who
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country;
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to reevents, is 3unable
5
turn to it.
Though the United States did not accede to the Convention, in
1968 it did accede to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Protocol),3 6 which incorporated the Convention's definition of a refugee and removed the restriction to persons displaced
as a result of pre-1951 events.3 7
Before the United States accession to the 1967 Protocol, asylum
relief was granted to aliens otherwise ineligible to remain in the
United States by the discretionary withholding of deportation under
section 243(h) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952
(INA).3" Before the Attorney General could exercise his discretion
and withhold deportation, the refugee had to show that he would be
subjected to "physical" persecution if returned home.3 9
Section 212(d)(5) of the 1952 Act also granted the Attorney
General the discretion to "parole into the United States temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or
for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying
for admission."4
Before the Attorney General's parole power
under this section was severely restricted by the Refugee Act of

35. Convention, supra note 34, at art. 1, § A(2). Note the similarity to the definition
found in the 1948 Displaced Persons Act, supra note 30.
36. Protocol, supra note 12.
37. Id. at art. 1, § 2.
38. Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 477, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C, § 1253(h) (1982)). The relief is now mandatory for those who qualify, and
"well-founded fear" of persecution has replaced "physical" persecution.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 212(d)(5) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1982)). This parole authority was used generally for applicants from Eastern Europe and was used in
1956 to admit 32,000 Hungarians into the U.S. See Schmidt, Development of United States
Refugee Policy, INS REPORTER, Fall 1979, at 1, 1.
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1980,"' this broad discretion was used many times to allow large
numbers of refugees to flee adverse circumstances, most notably
from Hungary, Western Europe, Cuba, and Indochina. Once the
Attorney General began paroling these refugees, it became apparent that their stay in the United States would not be temporary.
Special legislation was required to regularize the status of each
group of parolees by permitting them to adjust their status to permanent residence.4 2
In 1965 Congress amended the INA to change the old section
243(h) requirement of "physicial persecution" to "persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion."'4 3 However, the
1965 changes to section 243(h) did not affect the Attorney General's
discretionary power to deny the relief if he so chose. After the
United States' accession to the 1967 Protocol, many felt that this
discretion, as well as other United States immigration laws and policies, had to be changed for the United States to be in compliance
with the Protocol.

44

In 1970 the highly publicized "Kurdika Affair" highlighted the
need to change United States laws and policies to enable the system

41. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f), 94 Stat. 102, 107-08 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(A), (B) (1982)).
42. See Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419 (1958) (authorizing Hungarian refugees paroled into the U.S. to adjust status after two-year residence); Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat.
504 (1960) (Fair Share Refugee Act) (permitting 20,000 refugees, predominately Western Europeans, paroled under UNHCR Mandate to adjust status after two-year residence); Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (authorizing all paroled Cubans who
arrived afterJan. 1, 1959, to adjust status after two-year residence); Pub. L. No. 95-145,
91 Stat. 1223 (1977) (authorizing paroled Indochinese refugees to adjust status after
two-year residence); Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (1978) (authorizing all refugees
who were paroled before Sept. 30, 1980, to adjust status after two-year residence).
43. Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(), 79 Stat. 911, 918 (1965) (current version, after the
Refugee Act of 1980 made the Attorney General's discretionary power to withhold
mandatory relief for those who qualified, at INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982)).
The 1965 changes to § 243(h) generated much favorable comment. See, e.g., Frank, Effect
of the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees in the United States, 11 INT'L LAw. 291, 293
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Frank, Effect of the 1967 Protocol].
44. See generally Frank, Effect of the 1967 Protocol, supra note 43, at 294-302; Helton, .- n
Unfulfilled Promise, supra note 26, at 246-50 (discussing the uneven and inconsistent application of the 1967 Protocol); Note, Right to Asylum, supra note 25, at 1127-32 (discussing
the views of the BIA on § 243(h) since U.S. accession to the 1967 Protocol); Note, Behind
the Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
107, 131-34 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Behind the Paper Curtain] (discussing the
reasons behind Congress' failure to make greater reforms in this area); Comment, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws: Further Developments, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
571 (1972) (discussing judicial and administrative trends in interpreting § 243(h)).
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to cope with United States obligations to refugees under the Protocol.4 5 That event underscored the need to create a coherent asylum
policy to ensure that the United States would not be remiss in its
obligations not to return an alien to a country where he or she
would be persecuted.
The limitation in the definition of those entitled to refugee-type
relief also needed change. The 1965 amendments to the INA added
a seventh preference, conditional entry status, to the six occupational and familial preferences for legal immigration.4 6 Conditional
entry, however, was available only to those fleeing Communist
countries or countries from the general area of the Middle East. But
the Protocol's definition of "refugee" was still broader in scope and
contained no ideological or geographical bias, requiring relief from
persecution for all refugees. Though some members of Congress
were aware of the need to change the definition of refugee as early
as 1973, 4 7 it was not until 1980 that United States law appeared to
be in compliance with the Protocol.4 8 Although theoretically no
change was necessary since the Protocol was a treaty capable of superseding prior inconsistent laws,4 9 unambiguous statutory provisions would systematize the procedure, better ensuring compliance.

45. Kurdika was a Lithuanian seaman who jumped aboard a U.S. Coast Guard vessel
while his Russian vessel was tied alongside in U.S. territorial waters for discussion on
fishing rights. The Coast Guard permitted the Soviets to come aboard and forcibly return Kurdika to his ship without an opportunity to claim asylum. The event focused
attention on the incoherency of U.S. asylum procedure, forcing the Secretary of State to
issue a policy statement that all future political asylum requests be given full consideration under the provisions of the Protocol. 37 Fed. Reg. 3447 (1972), modified i Public
Notice 728, 45 Fed. Reg. 70,621 (1980).
46. Pub. L. No. 89-236 § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 913 (1965) (repealed by Pub. L. 96-212, 94
Stat. 102, 107 (1980)). Though the relief was originally limited to refugees from Coinmunist countries or a county in the general area of the Middle East, this provision was
expanded by Congress in 1976 (Act. of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat.
2703), and again in 1978 (Act. of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907), and
made available to 17,400 refugees per year, regardless of their origin.
47. See 119 CONG. REC. 35,734-37 (1973) (statements of Sen. Kennedy introducing
S. 2643 that proposed a definition of refugee similar to that of the Protocol); 119 Coe.
REC. 31,454-55 (1973) (statements of Rep. Eilberg introducing H.R. 981); see also Western
Hemisphere Immigration: Hearings on H. R. 981 Before House Subcomni. No. 1 of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) in which witnesses commended the bill's employment of Protocol language. Id. at 249-50, 258-59, 304, 306, 326.
48. See itfra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
49. Since the Protocol incorporated the substantive provisions of the Convention, it
also was a treaty and, as a treaty, became part of the supreme law of the land under
article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. Frank, Effect of/lhe 1967 Protocol,
supra note 43, at 296; Stepick, Haitian Boat People: 4 Study in the Conflicting Forces Shaping
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The primary aim of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to provide
comprehensive and systematic relief to a broad class of refugees
fearing persecution in their country of origin. Congress stated:
[I]t is the historic policy of the United States to respond to
the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their
homelands, including, where appropriate, humanitarian
assistance for their care and maintenance in asylum areas,
efforts to promote opportunities for resettlement or voluntary repatriation, aid for necessary transportation and
processing, admission to this country of refugees of special
humanitarian concern to the United States, and transitional
assistance to refugees in the United States. 5 '
It was hoped that the Refugee Act would put an end to the geographical and ideological bias of previous refugee admissions and
focus instead on the broader humanitarian concern for those fleeing
persecution anywhere.5 2 Most important to this objective was the
adoption of a facially neutral definition of refugee.5 3 Congress
U.S. Immigration Policy, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 170 (1982); cf. Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984) (focusing on customary international law).
50. Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
51. Id. § 101(a), 94 Stat. at 102.
52. See Anker & Posner, supra note 27, at 11; SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION &
REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, FINAL REPORT

158 (198 1). Endorsing the adoption of the Protocol definition of refugee, the Commission stated that
[bly emphasizing persecution and fear of persecution without regard to national origins, the Refugee Act establishes criteria based on special humanitarian concerns. The Act thus provides needed flexibility in defining refugee
status in accordance with a universal standard that is not bound by specific ideological or geographic criteria which were used in earlier definitions.
Id. The 1965 amendments to the INA created a seventh preference, conditional entrance status, enabling refugees from Communist countries and countries in the general
area of the Middle East to gain admittance. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965)
(repealed in part by Refugee Act of 1980) (current version codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-59
(1982)). See also Anker & Posner, supra note 27, at 17-20.
For historical background on the creation of the Select Commission, see Kennedy,
Foreward, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 2-6 (1981).

53. The definition under the Refugee Act is
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on accont of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion . ...
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made clear its intent that the definition be the same as the Protocol
Though the language in the Refugee Act is not identidefinition.
cal with that of the Protocol (the Protocol being more concise), in
substance the two definitions are consistent.5 5
Changing the section 243(h) withholding of deportation provisions was important to ensuring compliance with United States obligations under the Protocol. 5(' Article 33 of the 1951 Convention,

incorporated into the 1967 Protocol, mandates that the contracting
state not return a refugee to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened, 57 but prior to the 1980 amendments section 243(h) left the decision of whether to withhold deportation to
the discretion of the Attorney General. 58 The Refugee Act modified
section 243(h) to require the Attorney General not to return any

Refugee Act of 1980, INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(42)(A) (1982).
54. Protocol, supra note 12. There is much support for this interpretation in the
legislative history. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 3,757 (1980) ("The new definition makes
our law conform to the United Nations Convention and Protocol.") (statement of Sen.
Kennedy); Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciart, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(1979) (effect of the Act is "the replacing of the existing definition of refugee with the
definition which appears in the United Nations Convention and Protocol") (statement of
Rep. Fish).
55. Compare INA § 101(a) (42)(A), supra note 53, with the Protocol definition, as it
modified the Convention definition, supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) (the change was "necessary so that U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal obligations under international
agreements").
57. Convention, supra note 34, at art. 33. Article 33 provides:
Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ("Refoulement'")
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country.
58. See generally, Note, The Right to As ,lum Under United States Immigration Law, 33 U.
FLA. L. REV. 539, 547 (1981) (observing that the 1980 amendments prevent the Attorney
General from exercising discretion if s/he finds that an alien's "life or freedom would be
threatened"); Note, Section 243(h) of the Immigration and .ationality Act of 1952 as Aiended
by the Refugee Act of 1980: A Prognosis and a Proposal, 13 CORNELL INT'l. L.J. 291 (1980)
(arguing that even though § 243(h) withholding of deportation was made mandatory to
those who could show that they were refugees from persecution, the Atorney General
nonetheless has the power to decide who is a refugee; thus, the relief § 243(h) provides
is still not as much as Article 33 mandates).
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alien to a country where he or she would be persecuted, and extended the relief to aliens in both deportation and exclusion proceedings. 5" Though Congress believed that United States law
already comported with the mandatory non-return (nonrefouler)
provisions of Article 33 of the Convention, it felt that the changes
were necessary to clarify the legal obligations imposed by the
Protocol. 60

The Act eliminated the geographical and ideological bias of the
seventh preference conditional entry and severely limited the Attorney General's power to parole large numbers of refugees. 6 ' It was
hoped that these two changes would help standardize the refugee
programs6 2 by eliminating many of the political elements that had
influenced past relief actions.6 3
Though not required under the Protocol, Congress authorized
the Attorney General to establish an asylum procedure 64 for those
aliens who qualify under the definition of refugee6 5 and are already
physicially present within the United States. This procedure provided under INA section 208 is distinct from the withholding of deportation set out under section 243(h). The decision under section
208 whether to grant asylum status to an alien already in the United
States, even if that alien meets the definition of refugee, is left to the
59. Section 243(h) (1), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982), provides: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ...

to a country if the Attorney General

determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. (emphasis added). The regulations make clear that the section also
applies to the excludee. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208-10(a) (1985). See also S. REP. No. 256, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 515, 531.
60. H. R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979) ("Although [§ 243(h)] has
been held by court and administrative decisions to accord to aliens the protection required under Article 33, the Committee feels it desirable, for the sake of clarity, to conform the language of that section to the Convention."); S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1980) (the amendments to § 243(h) were made "with the understanding that it
is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the language
be construed consistent with the Protocol").
61. Refugee Act of 1980, INA § 203(e). Currently, the Attorney General cannot parole into the U.S. any refugee unless there is a compelling reason in the public interest
to do so. INA § 212(d)(5)(A) & (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) & (B) (1982).
62. See, Note, The Right of Aslnuni Under United States Inmigration Law, 33 U. Ft %. L.
REV. 539, 545, nn. 40-44 and accompanying text (1981).
63. Prior to the Refugee Act, the Attorney General (whose position is highly political) through his parole power would admit large numbers of refugees, usually from
Communist countries like Hungary, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam, and Cambodia.
See generally, Martin, Refugee Act, supra note 27, at 92-96.
64. Refugee Act of 1980, INA § 208 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982)).
65. Id. § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), supra note 53.
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discretion of the Attorney General."
Overseas refugees are treated differently. Though they may
meet the statutory definition of a refugee, 7 they are subject to certain numerical restrictions.6 8 The number of overseas refugees to
be admitted each year is determined by the President, after consultation with Congress, before the beginning of each fiscal year. 6 1'
This number is independent of other quotas regulating the flow of
immigrants and can be increased by the President if an unforeseen
refugee situation arises. 71 Once the ceiling on the number of refugees to be admitted is set, barring any unforeseen situations, the
President must allocate the number among various competing
classes of refugees that qualify as "refugees of special humanitarian
concern to the United States.'
If an overseas refugee is resettled in the United States and has
been physically present for a year, that refugee can apply for admission as an immigrant and will no longer be required to return to his
or her country once the threat of persecution abates. 7 1 When a refugee applies for admission as an immigrant, the refugee benefits
from an automatic waiver of certain exclusionary criteria found in
INA section 212(a) that would make ordinary applicants for immigration inadmissible.7 3
Though the 1980 Refugee Act established a facially neutral definition of a refugee, the results of asylum adjudications pursuant to
section 208 of refugees already in the United States, and withholding of deportation decisions under section 243(h), along with the
State Department evidence, suggest that nonneutral factors play a
role in the outcome of these claims.

66. Id. § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
67. See id. § 101(a)(42)(a), 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A).
68. See id. § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
69. Id. § 207(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2).
70. Id. § 207(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b).
71. Id. § 207(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(3).
72. Id. § 209(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a).
73. Id. § 207(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3); id. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182. The provisions of § 212(a) that are waived are: (14) (labor qualifications), (15) (likely to become a
public charge), (20) (lack of proper documents), (21) (lack of proper immigrant visa),
(25) (literacy requirement), and (32) (unaccredited medical school graduates). Moreover, the Attorney General may waive other exclusionary criteria of § 212(a) "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unit or when it is otherwise in the public interest.'"
Id. § 107(c)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3).
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CURRENT ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION
PROCEDURES AND LEGAL STANDARDS

There are now two methods by which one who is physically

present in the United States and faces persecution in his or her
homeland can secure refugee status. The alien can either apply for
asylum under section 208(a) or, if deportation or exclusion proceedings have been initiated, the alien can request withholding of deportation under section 243(h)."4 Though technically distinct, these
two methods often converge 7 5 and involve the same factual determination. 76 However, the standards of proof 7 7 and the standards of
appellate review 78 may not be the same.
Currently there is much confusion as to whether the legal standard for establishing eligibility under section 208(a) is the same as
or is less stringent than the standard applied pursuant to section
243(h). 79 Recently, in Matter of Acosta,8 ° the Board of Immigration
74. See supra notes 59 & 64 and accompanying text.
75. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1985) ("Asylum requests [pursuant to § 208(a)] made
after the institution of exclusion . . . proceedings shall . . . be considered as requests
for withholding exclusion or deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of this Act."); see
also Matter of Martinez-Romero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 75 (BIA 1981).
76. To qualify for relief under INA § 208(a) or § 243(h), the alien must show he or
she is avoiding persecution; however § 208(a) requires the alien to be a refugee, i.e.,
unwilling to return home because of a "well-founded fear of persecution," 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a)(42)(A)(1982), while under § 243(h), the alien must show that his "life or freedom would be threatened," 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
77. INA § 208(a). See aLso INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (holding that an alien
must establish a "clear probability" of persecution under § 243(h), avoiding a ruling on
the distinction between "well-founded fear" of persecution and "clear probability" of
persecution, and noting that it was not a request for asylum under § 108(a)).
78. See Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1282 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1984), stating:
Because the form of relief available under section 243(h) is no longer discretionary [since the passage of the Refugee Act], the limited abuse of discretion
standard of review that we applied to decisions under the former section. . . is
no longer applicable. The mandatory language of the amended section requires us to review the BIA's denial of an application for a prohibition against
deportation under a heightened, substantial evidence standard of review.
See also Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 629 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that references to the Board's discretionary power have been made under a motion to reopen a
petitioner's claim for discretionary relief); Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 289
(9th Cir. 1984) (denying refuge under § 243(h) to alien seeking to maintain political
neutrality within his homeland); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that factual findings under the Refugee Act of 1980 are subject to review tinder
the substantial evidence test).
79. Compare Solto v. INS, 748 F.2d 832, 836 (3rd Cir. 1984) ("Since a request to
withhold deportation is frequently joined with a request for asylum in the contexi of
deportation proceedings, it is fitting to apply congruent standards.") (emphasis added)
and Re jaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982) (well-founded fear "equates with"
clear probability) with Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574-75 (7th Cir. 1984)
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Appeals (BIA) held that
as a practical matter of the showing contemplated by the
phrase "a well-founded fear" of persecution [for section
208(a) relief] converges with the showing described by the
phrase "a clear probability" of persecution [for section
243(h) relief] . .

.

.Accordingly, we have not found a sig-

nificant difference between the showings required for asylum and withholding of deportation. 8 '
Confronted with conflicting opinions in different federal circuits,
the BIA simply blazed out on its own and found the two standards
to be more or less the same.8 2 This action was harshly criticized by
the Ninth Circuit in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS. 8 3 There the court reversed and remanded a BIA decision on the ground that it was improper to apply the "clear probability of persecution" standard to
section 208(a) asylum claims. 8 4 The court condemned the Board's
action in Acosta, stating "the Board appears to feel exempt from the
holding of Marbury v. Madison . . .and not constrained by circuit

court opinions." 8 5 Since the Supreme Court has granted the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari in Cardoza-Fonseca, 6 the issue
may finally be settled.8 7
A.

INA Section 243(h) Withholding of Deportation

Once an alien is found to be deportable by an immigration
judge, a specific country is designated as the country of deportation.
If the alien believes he or she would be subject to persecution if
("Although [the 'well-founded fear'] evidentiary burden is very similar to that connected
with the 'clear probability' standard, it is not identical.") and Youkhanna v. INS, 749
F.2d 360 362, (6th Cir. 1984) ("[The 'well-founded fear'] standard does require less
than the 'clear probability' standard applied to . . .section 243 .... ") and CardozaFonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1985) ("clear probability" and "wellfounded fear" standards not identical and it is error to apply the stricter "clear
probability" standard to § 208(a) claims and not the "more generous" "well-founded
fear" standard).
80. Interim Dec. No. 2986 (BIA Mar. 1, 1985).
81. Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 6.
83. 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 1455.
85. Id. at 1454.
86. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted. 54 U.S.L.W.
3546 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 85-767). See generally InteipreterReleases. Feb. 28. 1986. at
187 (discussing the importance of the Supreme Court's grant of the petition for certiorari in Cardoza-Fonseca).
87. This issue was left open by the Court in INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984): se
supra note 77.
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deported to the designated country, he or she must submit an application for temporary withholding of deportation within ten days of
the deportation order."8 The burden is on the alien to establish that
he or she "would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." 9 Once this is established, section
243(h) requires the Attorney General not to deport or return the
alien to any country where that "alien's life or freedom would be
threatened." 9 ° However, "[a] grant of section 243(h) relief is
merely a stay of deportation. Should substantial changes occur in
the country from which such relief is granted, or if, for other reasons, the grant should need to be reevaluated, the [INS] can move
for reopening."'"
The Supreme Court has recently considered the question of
what showing an alien must make to be entitled to relief. In INS v.
Stevic,9 2 the Court held that "an alien must establish a clear
probability of persecution to avoid deportation under Section
243(h)." 9 3 The Court "deliberately avoided any attempt to state the
governing standard [for section 243(h) relief] beyond noting that it
requires that an application be supported by evidence establishing
that it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to
persecution." 9 4
Section 243(h) relief differs from section 208(a) asylum status
in several important respects. First, a section 243(h) hearing can be
conducted without a State Department advisory opinion.9 5 Second,
an alien who is successful under section 243(h) does not obtain a
secure status, as does a section 208(a) asylee, and may be deported
to his or her country of national origin or another country where
persecution is less likely. 9 6 And, finally, the standard of review is
more stringent. Since section 243(h) relief is made mandatory for
those that qualify,9 7 unlike the discretionary nature of section 208(a)
88. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1985).
89. Id.
90. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
91. Matter of Lam, 18 1. & N. Dec. 15, 16 n.2 (BIA 1981).
92. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 429-30.
95. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1985) with 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1985).
96. See Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982) (though the applicant's claim
for withholding of deportation to Afghanistan was upheld, the court stated that
"[s]ection 243(h) relief is 'country specific' and . . . that section would not prevent his
exclusion and deportation to Pakistan or any other hospitable country if that country will
accept him.") Id. at 315.
97. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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relief, courts have found that "the new mandatory language of section 243(h) justifies replacing the abuse-of-discretion standard."' 8
B.

INA Section 208(a) Asylum

Before the passage of the Refugee Act, no statutory asylum status existed. The broad use of parole and seventh preference conditional entry were the typical procedures available to those fleeing
persecution." Also, after 1972 the INA regulations provided a hap-

hazard asylum procedure on request before a district director.' 0 0
1.

Application Procedure.-Currently, section 208(a) vests au-

thority in the Attorney General to grant asylum to a refugee already
in the United States.' 0 ' This authority is delegated to both INS district directors and immigration judges by regulation. 10 2 An applicant for asylum, if not already in exclusion or deportation

proceedings, may apply to the district director by filing an 1-589
form.'0 3 If exclusion or deportation proceedings have been instituted, the applicant must file the 1-589 form with the docket clerk of
0 4
the immigration court.1

Besides requiring basic personal background information, the
1-589 requests information necessary to support a claim of a well98. McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981). Accord Espinoza-Martinez
v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1539-40 (9th Cir. 1985).
99. In 1952 the Attorney General was granted the authority to parole into the United
States any alien "for emergent reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." Immigration and Naturalization Act, § 212(d)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 188 (1952). (For examples of its
use, see supra note 41.) The Refugee Act restricted this power by stating that "[tihe
Attorney General may not parole. . . an alien who is a refugee .. " Pub. L. 96-612, 94
Stat. 102, 108, INA § 212(d)(5)(B) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B) (1982)). The
conditional entry status, created in 1965, see supra note 43, was repealed entirely by the
Refugee Act, Pub. L. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 107 (1980).
100. 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1972); Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla.
1977), vacated 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978).
101. Section 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States . . . to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determining that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101 (a) (42)
(A) of this title.
For text of § I 101(a)(42)(A), see supra note 53.
102. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a),(b)(1985).
103. Id. 88 208.2, 208.3(a).
104. Id. § 208.3(b). If the alien applying for admission has been served with notice to
appear before an immigration judge or the alien has been served with an order to show
cause pursuant to deportation procedure, then proceedings have been deemed instituted and the form must be filed with the docket clerk of the immigration court. See id.
§ 208.3(a)(2).
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founded fear of persecution. Much of the information requested is
subjective in nature, such as what the applicant thinks would happen
if returned,10 5 and what actions the applicant has taken that the applicant believes would result in persecution.l0 6 The form also seeks
specific detailed information to substantiate the applicant's claims;
for example, to what organizations the applicant or members of his
or her family belonged, including dates of membership, positions
held, purpose of organization, and the member's duties. 10 7 It also
asks for the names and addresses of witnesses and documents to
verify all incidents of detention, interrogation, convictions, and
imprisonments. 0 8
The 1-589 form is then forwarded to the Bureau of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) of the State Department
for an advisory opinion. District directors are required to request
an advisory opinion.' 0 9 The director is also required to note
whether he or she feels the application is meritorious, without merit,
or undetermined, and to include an assessment of the applicant's
credibility, identifying specific areas of doubt."' An immigration
judge must request an advisory opinion if one has not already been
obtained by a district director, or if circumstances have changed
substantially since the first opinion was sent and a new one would
"materially aid in adjudicating the asylum request.""!
2. BHRHA Advisory Opinion Procedure.-Since the burden is on
the applicant "to establish that he/she is unable or unwilling to return to [his or her country] . . . because of persecution or a well-

founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion,"" ' 2 the
BHRHA will compare the information the applicant provides on the
1-589 form with information available to the State Department to
determine whether the applicant has met that burden. Elliot
Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for BHRHA, described
the internal process by which the determination is made:
105. INS Form 1-589, Request for Asylum in the United States (Revised 3/1/81),
question 31 (available from any INS district office).
106. Id. question 35.
107. Id. question 34.
108. Id. question 36.
109. 8 C.F.R. § 208.7 (1985).
110. I.N.S. Operations Instructions (01) § 208.9(d) (1980) (reprinted in 4 IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE,

§ 23-156.17 (C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield eds. 1984).

i1I. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(b) (1985).
112. Id. § 208.5.
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Each application is reviewed individually by an officer in
the Office of Asylum Affairs of [BHR]HA and then is sent
to the appropriate country desk officer in the Department.
If appropriate, [BHR]HA may request an opinion from the
Office of the Legal Adviser or information from the U.S.
Embassy in the applicant's country of nationality, or, if appropriate, in a third country. After agreement is reached
between the asylum officer in [BHR]HA and the desk officer on the proposed recommendation to INS, the draft
advisory opinion and application file are reviewed by the
Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs in [BHR]HA, and
in some cases by the geographic officer in [BHR]HA or by
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asylum and Humanitarian Affairs. It is rare for individual cases to rise to more
senior levels. The proposed recommendation is then
signed by the Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs and
sent to INS.
The phrase "well-founded fear of being persecuted" is
a key phrase. A knowledge of the conditions in the applicant's country of origin is an imporant element in assessing
the applicant's credibility and whether his fear may be considered "well-founded." It is at this point where the Deunique and
partment of State performs a crucial,
l l3
irreplaceable role in assisting the INS.
The BHRHA advisory opinion is reached by consulting various
sources. Primarily, the Bureau looks at the information on the
alien's 1-589 asylum application. The Bureau "assumes that information presented in asylum claims is true unless it is self-contradictory or contradicts information already known to be true."' ' If the
BHRHA finds an application to be "ambiguous or confusing," then
15
it usually recommends denial because the burden is on the alien.'
Unfortunately, the quality of each application varies greatly.
For information relating to the human rights conditions of the
applicant's country of origin, a BHRHA asylum officer might consult
113. Refugee Assistance: Hearings on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on Intmigration, Refugees
and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on theJudiimy, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 55-56 (1983)
(prepared statement of Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State) [hereinafter cited as Refugee Assistance
Hearings].
114. Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making: The Systems of Ten Couitries, 19 STAN. J. INT'L

L. 235, 334 (1983) (citing to interview with Lawrence Arthur, Chief Asylum Officer.
BHRHA, U.S. State Dep't, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 17, 1982)) 1hereinafter cited as
Avery, Refugee Status Diecisin-Alaking].
115. Id.; 8 C.R.F. § 208.5 (1985).
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a number of sources, including the particular State Department
"country desk."' 16 Though there are no formalized instructions
for
processing an application, 117 it appears that the "country desk" consultation is an integral part of the informal procedure. This consultation has been criticized because it permits foreign policy
considerations to enter into the asylum decisionmaking process.'
Occasionally, an applicant will benefit from a blanket assumption that all within a certain class are eligible for asylum. Iranian
Jews, for example, are automatically deemed to have met the test of
a well-founded fear of persecution and should be granted asylum
unless otherwise ineligible." 9
D. Asylum Adjudication Procedure
If the applicant applied for asylum with the district director,
pursuant to section 208(a), the advisory opinion is returned to be
considered in the director's decision. "The district director may approve or deny the asylum application in the exercise of discretion."' 2 ° If the decision, which must be in writing,' 2 ' is based in
whole or in part on the advisory opinion, the opinion will be incorporated into the record unless the opinion contained classified information. 122 Once the opinion is in the record, the applicant is
given the opportunity to read the opinion, explain, and rebut its
conclusion. 123 Though no appeal can be made from the district director's decision, 24 the applicant can later request asylum before an
immigration judge in deportation or exclusion hearings. 2 5 An I589 form must be filed with the docket clerk.' 26 The immigration
judge must adjourn the hearing and request an advisory opinion, if
116. Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making,supra note 114, at 334.
117. Deposition ofJules Bassin, Office of Asylum Affairs, BHRHA, U.S. Dep't of State
at 98 (Aug. 10, 1983), Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502
(D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Bassin Deposition I].
118. See infra notes 166-189 and accompanying text.
119. Letter from Edward H. Wilkinson, Director, Office of Asylum Affairs, BHRHA
(Sept. 26, 1985) in INTERPRETER RELEASES, Oct. 18, 1985, at 1000.
120. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a) (1985).
121. Id. § 208.8(b).
122. Id. § 208.8(d). Classified information is suppressed under Exec. Order No.
12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
123. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(d) (1985).
124. Id. § 208.8(c).
125. Id. § 208.9. See generally INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 73-76 (dis-

tinguishing immigration judges' decisions from those of the district director and identifying certain problems).
126. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b), § 208.10(a) (1985).
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necessary, and make that opinion part of the record.' 2 7 As with an
adjudication before the district director, the applicant can inspect
the opinion, explain, and rebut its conclusion. 2 If the immigration
judge decides not to grant asylum, the applicant may appeal to the
BIA, which can review the decision of the immigration judge, along
2
with the immigration judge's deportation and exclusion orders.' "
It is important for an applicant to produce a substantial record for
his or her claim since the BIA can review only the evidence and record of the proceeding before the immigration judge. 13 If the BIA
sustains the immigration judge's final deportation or exclusion order, it can be appealed to either a United States federal district court
by a writ of habeas corpus 13 or, if it is a deportation order, to the
32
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.'
However, the scope of review at this level is limited to an examination of alleged errors of law or procedure or an examination of the
record to see if the decision was arbitrary or capricious, applying a
3
substantial evidence standard.1
Though there are various avenues an applicant can take to have
the denial of his asylum claim reviewed, questions remain as to what
role the advisory opinions should play. How much influence does
the advisory opinion have on the outcome? How should adjudicating officers treat the opinions? How can an applicant question the
opinion's probative value? And, finally, how can a reviewing court
assess the influence of an advisory opinion on the asylum
decisionmaker?
127. Id. § 208.10(b). Again, if the information is classified, it will not be made part of
the record. See supra note 122.
128. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(b).
129. Id. § 3.1(b); see also Verkuil, A Study of mmigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV.
1141, 1180 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Verkuil, Immigration Procedures] (the BIA reviews
asylum decisions as raised in the course of deportation and exclusion hearings).
130. See Scanlan, 1Who is a Refugee?, supra note 25, at 31-33; Avery, Status Decision-Makiug, supra note 114, at 342. The applicant should try to get as much personal information relating to his or her claim into the record as possible. Newspaper articles and
other independent reports of the human rights situation in the applicant's home country
are also useful sources on appeal. If the advisory opinion did not recommend asylum,
evidence questioning the accuracy of the opinion and the procedures used to arrive at
the opinion should also be entered into the record.
131. INA §§ 106(a)(9), 106(b), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1105a(a)(9), 1105a(b) (1982); see Flores v.
INS, 524 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1975).
132. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982).
133. Since a claim for asylum before an immigration judge is also treated as an INA
§ 243(h) request for withholding, which is mandatory if the applicant is eligible, 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.3(b), then the substantial evidence standard is appropriate. See McN'Itllen v. INS.
658 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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THE ADVISORY OPINION IN THE ADJUDICATORY PROCESS

A.

Expertise Needed

INS officers and immigration judges deal with the entire range
of immigration issues, not just asylum questions. It would be unreasonable to expect these officials to keep abreast of human rights
conditions in foreign countries so that they, independently, can
make informed decisions on the merits of individual claims for asylum. The purpose behind admitting advisory opinions into the adjudicatory process is more than just complying with the
regulations; 134 it is also "to bring forth any information available to
the State Department which supports the applicant's claim; and...
to indicate the State Department's opinion regarding the likelihood
of persecution given the specific facts presented by the applicant." 135
Because an applicant's claim turns on a finding of a subjective
fear based on objective facts, 13 6 there is a need for information to
which INS officials and immigration judges simply do not have access. Rarely are INS officials trained in the application of international refugee law. ' 37 New INS officials are given a two-week course
on all immigration law, during which less than three hours is devoted to refugee and asylum issues.' 3 ' Immigration judges, similarly, receive no training on international refugee law, l1' yet they
must determine the merits of an applicant's claim by applying that
law.

134. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1985).
135. Matter of Exilus, 18 1. & N. Dec. 276, at 279 (BIA 1982).
136. The applicant's fear of persecution at home is necessarily a subjective fact, but
for that fear to be "well-founded," however, an objective evaluation must be made. See
generally Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 12-13 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as UNHCR, Handbook] (stating that the determination should be based on factors such
as the alien's character, background, influence, wealth, and outspokenness, as well as the
laws and conditions of his/her country of origin and the experience of the applicant's
friends and relatives).
137. See FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, supra note 21, at 17. In this study of
asylum adjudications in New York City, it was discovered that the INS interviewers were
not required to be formally trained in asylum problems, though some training programs
did exist on a small scale elsewhere in the nation.
138. INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, sitpra note 5, at 32. These three hours encompass
the major provisions of the Refugee Act. The role of the BHRHA advisory opinion is
not discussed. Id.
139. Avery, Refugee Stats Decision-,faking, supra note 114, at 332 n.849 (citing interview with authority on U.S. asylum determination system; name withheld hy request).
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Besides being untrained in international refugee law, INS officials and immigration judges generally have scant knowledge of the
conditions in other countries. Reports indicate that INS officials
lack knowledge of the political and social conditions in the countries
where the asylum applicants originate. 140 The typical INS official
"is someone who has been at INS for less than 5 years, has a B.A.
degree from a state university (usually in business, education, or
public administration), and has not traveled extensively or lived
outside the United States.""'4 Immigration judges also lack specific
knowledge of world human rights conditions. One authority
remarked:
Most immigration judges are very unsophisticated in world
affairs. For example, many of the judges do not understand why there would be any problem if a Pakistani married a Christian, and many do not appreciate the
significance of being a Kurd in Iraq. Fortunately, most of
the judges recognize their lack of
knowledge-those who
42
do not are the dangerous ones. 1
The State Department, on the other hand, specializes in compiling and interpreting information on political and social conditions
in other countries. This expertise can be of invaluable assistance to
INS officials and immigration judges who need information.
The State Department also specializes in politics, with which
INS officials and immigration judges feel uncomfortable. One study
concluded that the discomfort immigration judges experience with
political questions leads to a certain amount of deference to State
Department opinions:
[Immigration judges] understand they will be making possible life or death decisions on the basis of subjective impressions and with minimum evidence. Several noted the
presence of political factors and pressures in asylum cases,
especially with regard to the larger, more controversial
groups, e.g., Salvadorans, Haitians, and Poles. None
would elaborate on the nature of these political factors,
and all asserted their independence ofjudgment, but some
did express the feeling that they were being obliged to
make judicial decisions which were more properly made in
140. See llaitian Emigation, Ilea rings Before Mhe House Subeomin. on lmoIigsation, Citizenship,
and International Law of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976).
141. INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 33.
142. Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making,supra note 114, at 332 n. 850 (quoting U.S.
system authority; name withheld by request).
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the political arena, and on political grounds. For the immigration judges, as for the examination officers, political
judgments are seen as the domain of the Department of
State. Judges do not dispute State Department country expertise, even if they may differ with advisory opinion letters
on specific cases.' 4 3
In view of the need for expert input from the State Department
and the apparent deference asylum adjudicators give to the State
Department opinions, an examination of the process by which the
opinions are made is necessary.
B.

BHRHA Sources

1. The Asylum Application.-The 1-589 asylum application is the
main source of information used by the BHRHA.' 4 4 If the application is ambiguous, the BHRHA generally does not recommend asylum, reasoning that the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove
a well-founded fear of persecution.' 4 5 Unfortunately, there are
many problems with the manner in which the applications are filled
out.
First, the quality and completeness of the applications vary
from district to district 4 6 and the applications submitted from immigration judges are notoriously incomplete. 4 7 One study found
143. FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, supra note 21, at 16.
144. Deposition of Lawrence L. Arthur, Chief Asylum Officer, BHRHA, U.S. Dep't of
State at 102 (Apr. 20, 1983), Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, No. 82-1107 (C.D. Cal.
1982).
145. Telephone interview with Jules Bassin, Office of Asylum Affairs, BHRHA, U.S.
Dep't ofJustice (Apr. 26, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Bassin Interview]. See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.5 (1985); UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 136, at 47.
146. INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 37 ("Some districts have officers
dedicated to asylum adjudications . . . others use officers on a time available basis.
Some districts complete the entire adjudication in less than 20 minutes; others spend
from two to twelve hours."). One State Department staff member stated:
The biggest problem we have is the unevenness of applications . . . sent in by
different district offices. If the INS officer recommends that the application be
denied, why does he think it should be denied? Some of [the district] offices
are great-we get very detailed views. Others couldn't seem to care less.
Id. at 60. Apparently, the Boston office produces the best applications because its staff
has taken a special interest in asylum claims. Said one BHRHA officer, "Boston is
tops.... The applications we get from them are complete, and their opinions are well
reasoned and well written." Id. at 34; see also Bassin Deposition I, supra note 117, at 25,
117. (Only four out of 38 districts consistently furnish information from the interview of
the applicant. Id.).
147. Bassin Interview, supra note 145. ("Applications from the courts are really poor.
The trial attorney doesn't send in the application and there is little documentation and
no interview." Id.).
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that some INS officials "cut corners in their interviewing and recordkeeping [by] not following up on questions relevant to a particular applicant's claim, not producing an account of the interview
useful to the BHRHA. .

.

.""'

This problem is compounded by

the fact that most asylum claimants are not effectively represented
by an attorney,'" do not understand their burden of showing a
well-founded fear, 15" and are unable to document their assertions
adequately. 151
The cursory treatment some INS officials give the asylum application may stem from the inherent tension in the system between
providing a service to refugees and enforcing the immigration laws.
There is a strong enforcement mentality among many INS officials,t52 some of whom are former border patrol officers who have
15 3
been lied to often and tend to disbelieve an applicant's claim.
Moreover, the current delays in the system have undoubtedly
prompted some aliens to claim asylum in order to delay being deported.' 5 4 INS officials, aware of the practice, may think that the
poorly documented claims are frivolous and, thus, may be less likely
to follow up with questions that would help an applicant establish
his or her claim. The delays in the system also put pressures on INS
148. Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making,supra note 114, at 329 (quoting fromJ. Scanlan, "Asylum Procedures," "Asylum Board," and "Refugee Procedure" Segments of
Second Final Report Submitted to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy AB-3 (Oct. 8, 1980)).
149. See INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 42. (One examiner, doubting
the efficacy of legal representation, said, "When the alien has an attorney.., the application is usually more completely prepared. Some attorneys can help an alien prove his
claim, but not many. The typical lawyer just doesn't have the training or experience. In
most cases it's a waste of money.").
150. Id. at 43. See also UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 136, at 13 ("The expressions
'fear of persecution' or even 'persecution' are usually foreign to a refugee's normal
vocabulary.").
151. See Developments in the Law - Immigration Polic , and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1286, 1355 (1983); UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 136, at 47:
Often. . . an applicant may not be able to support his statements by documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide evidence of all
his statements will be the exception rather than the rule. In most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and
very frequently even without personal documents.
Id.
152. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TIlE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 40-43

(1980) (discussing studies, conducted by the INS and the President's Reorganization
Project, of the conflict between the service and enforcement missions of the INS).
153. Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making, supra note 114, at 330.
154. See generally Shuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLUM. 1L.REV. i. 41
(1984) (merely by filing an asylum claim, an alien automatically wins a delay in deportation until all avenues of administrative and judicial review have been exhausted).
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officials to alleviate the backlog by expediting the entire adjudicatory process,15 5 regardless of whether the officials feel that some ap156
plications are wholly without merit.
Given this background to the BHRHA's primary source of information, it would seem difficult for the BHRHA to maintain a uniform quality to their advisory opinions.
2. State Department Sources.-Within the State Department the
BHRHA consults a number of sources, including the annual Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices (Country Reports),'5 7 the various
"desks" devoted to managing information from and relations with
individual countries (country desks),' 5 8 cable traffic, 1 5 9 and, occasionally, the United States embassies abroad. 6 ° With the exception
of the country desk input, these sources appear to be generally reliable and informational in nature rather than political.
Though the Country Reports are not detailed enough to substantiate a particular claim for asylum, they are very useful for assessing
155. The INS has gone so far as to process Haitian asylum applications en masse. The
courts have found this unlawful. See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp.
442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
156. The motivation behind expediting the asylum process for Haitians was to act as a
deterrent to other Haitians who may wish to emigrate to the U.S. Id. at 514.
157. Bassin Interview, supra note 145. These country reports are published each February as Joint Committee Prints and are available in most libraries. The reports discuss
the human rights observance in each country under various headings such as civil and
political rights, torture, and arbitrary arrests. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR

1984, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jt. Comm. Print

1985).
158. Bassin Interview, supra note 145. The country desks are necessarily political positions since the desk officer's "primary mission is to maintain the best possible bilateral
relationship with the country in question." Note, Behind the Paper Curtain, supra note 44,
at 107, 134.
159. Bassin Interview, supra note 145. The cables are a routine product of the overseas embassy staff. In deposition, asylum officer Jules Bassin describes the process with
respect to El Salvador:
An embassy officer might have a conversation with somebody. He would report that. They will report-I think there are . . . weekly reports about violence, the statistics and so on. There may be other reporting on El Salvador
that I am not privy to. There are instances where telegrams will come in that
won't come to us because [they don't] have anything to do with refugees,
aliens, or human rights.
Deposition ofJules Bassin, Office of Asylum Affairs, BHRHA, U.S. Dep't of State at 2021 (Sept. 29, 1983), Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, No. 82-1107 (C.D. Cal. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Bassin Deposition II].
160. Direct communication with overseas embassy staff is rare. Typically, the purpose
would be to ask the embassy personnel to check a specific fact, such as whether a particular alien was an officer in a particular labor union. Bassin Interview, supra note 145.
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the general human rights practices of a particular country.'"" Australia ' -' and Canada'6 3 have found the Country Reports useful and

consult them, along with other sources, when determining the refugee status of aliens. Yet a survey of the Country Reports conducted by
three independent human rights organizations criticized the reports
as being somewhat slanted.'" 4 The survey concluded:
Though most of the work in compiling the Country Reports
has been carried on responsibly and effectively by the Department of State, political biases are evident in some of
the reports. There is no general overstatement of human
rights abuses in countries with which United States relations are not friendly. Nor is there any general understatement of abuses in countries friendly to the United States.
Rather, distortions in the reporting seem to reflect efforts
to further political events relating to particular
countries. 6' 5
The BHRHA consultation with country desk officers has been
more roundly criticized as a source of political bias in the advisory
opinions.16 6 Since country desk officers are responsible for maintaining the best possible relations with their particular countries,
there is a tendency to underrepresent the magnitude of human
rights violations in their countries so as not to damage United States
relations. This bias on the part of the desk officer is known as
"clientism" and the BHRHA personnel are aware of this problem. 6' 7 The desk officers themselves are aware of the special problem asylum grants create for them. One desk officer stated: "There
is no question that when we grant asylum to a refugee from a government.

. .

with which we are friendly, that government feels that

161. Bassin Interview, supra note 145.
162. Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making,supra note 114, at 247.
163. Id. at 267. Canada also uses the Country Reports in the orientation process of the
officials responsible for determining refugee status. Id. at 263.
164. Id. at 335, citing AMERICAS WATCH, HELSINKI WATCH, LAWYERS COMM. FOR INT'L
HUMAN RIGHTS, A CRITIQUE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1981 (1982).
165. Id. For extracts of specific examples by country, see Avery, Refugee Status DecisionMaking, supra note 114, at 335-36 n.878.
166. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, PoliticalAsylum in Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
France: Lessons for the United States, 17 MICH. J.L. REF. 183, 194 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Aleinikoff, Lessons for the United States]; Kurzban, Restructuringthe ./sylum Process, 19 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 91. 98-99 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Kurzban, Restructuring the .Asylum
Process]; Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations I Uder the Refugee
Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 618, 628 (1981); Note, Behind the Paper Curtain, supra
note 44, at 134-35.
167. Bassin Interview, supra note 145.
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its reputation is slighted, its honor impugned. This can only lead to
resentment and both governments lose out.'"" Another desk officer, commenting on a denial of an asylum claim, concluded: "We
didn't grant him asylum because the United States government
doesn't want to pass judgment on the internal conditions of allied
countries. That would cause resentment on their part and hurt the
bilateral relationship."' 69 Even though the desk officers no longer
have the input they once had in asylum grants, each advisory opinion still must be "cleared" with the desk officer.' 7 '
There is no direct evidence linking the input of desk officers
with subsequent INS denials of asylum claims to aliens from countries in which the United States has an interest in downplaying
human rights violations. However, one commentator feels the data
of actual asylum grants "create at least an appearance of political
distortion in the asylum process.''17

The following tables show the

number of asylum claims filed with the district directors since fiscal
year 1978 and the number of asylum claims granted from selected
countries with which the United States has a significant political
interest.

168. Note, Behind the Paper Curtain, supra note 44, at 134 (quoting State Department
desk officer for an Asian country; name withheld by request) (interview conducted in
1975 before the current asylum procedure was established by the 1980 Refugee Act).
169. Note, Behind the Paper Curtain, supra note 44, at 135 (quoting State Department
desk officer whose name was withheld by request) (interivew conducted in 1975 before
the current asylum procedure was established by the 1980 Refugee Act.)
170. See Refugee Assistance Hearings, supra note 113, at 55. "After agreement is reached
between the asylum officer. . . and the desk officer. . . the draft advisory opinion . . . [is]
reviewed by the Director of the Office of Asylum Affairs . . . signed . . . and sent to
INS." Id. (emphasis added.)
17 1. Aleinikoff, Lessonsfor the United States, supra note 166, at 194 (1984). The Lawyers
Committee for International Human Rights and Washington immigration attornev
Michael Maggio blame State Department institutional biases for the political distortion
in asylum grants. Hall, Rights Group Hits Toughened Asylum Standard, Wash. Post, Aug. 12,
1985, at A 1l, col. 3.
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TABLE

1172

ASYLUM APPLICATIONS BY FISCAL YEAR

FY
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

Number of Applications
3,702
5,801
15,955
61,568
33,246
26,091
24,295
16,662

172. TABLE I represents the author's compilation of data from tables entitled
Asylum Cases Filed with District Directors, available from STA'risTIcs DIVISION, INS and
spanning 1978 to 1985.
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TABLE 217:3
ASYLUM GRANTS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country
All Countries
Communist -

Number
Decided

FY 1984
Number
Granted

40,622

8,278

7
20.4

Number
Decided

FY 1985
Number
Granted

18,757

4,585

24.4

East European:

Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
E. Germany (DDR)
Hungary
Poland
Romania
U.S.S.R.

15
60
18
112
1,188
171
56

27
108
11
222
2,203
404
88

Other Communist or Communist Aligned:
Afghanistan
China
Cuba 174
Ethiopia

455
207
488
1,319

186
15
16
305

8,233
42
8,292

5,017
11
1,018

46
468
13,373
761
375
231
114

0
1
328
3
23
7
36

Other Anti-American:
Iran
Libya
Nicaragua

60.9
26.2
12.3

5,179
74
4,771

2,779
54
408

Western Aligned:
Chile
Egypt
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Pakistan
Philippines

19
140
2,373
432
674
68
109

6
0
74
5
4
10
29

There appears to be a relationship between an applicant's being
granted asylum and that applicant's coming from a Communist or
anti-American country. Anomalies do exist, however, such as
173. TABLE 2 was compiled by the author using data available from STATISTICS Div.

INS. For a table of FY 1982 and FY 1983 asylum grants for a similar selection of
countries, see Aleinikoff, Lessons for the United States, supra note 166, at 195.

174. The statistics for Cuba are greatly distorted by the Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub.
L. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966), which provides that any "native or citizen of Cuba ...
who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States... and has been
physically present in the United States for at least one year, may be adjusted ... to that
Since the majority of Cuban
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence...
asylum applicants benefit from this provision, which moots their asylum claim, only
those whom the INS would like to deport actually have their asylum applications
adjudicated.
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Cuba' 7 5 and Nicaragua, 1 76 where one would think the political bias
would favor asylum. Similarly, applicants from countries like Chile,
Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti all have very low success
rates, perhaps because United States political concerns somehow affected the outcome. One obvious exception to this proposition is
the Philippines, where the United States has a strong interest in
maintaining military bases; 17 7 yet the success rate for asylum applications is surprisingly high.
There are two ways in which political considerations can distort
the asylum statistics. One, which occurs when an adjudicator follows an advisory opinion recommending that a meritorious application be denied, violates Protocol obligations not to return refugees.
The other occurs when an adjudicator follows an advisory opinion
recommending that a nonmeritorious application be granted. This
second form of distortion violates only the language of the statute
and not the Protocol because granting asylum to those who do not
meet the Protocol definition of a refugee is not prohibited by that
treaty.'

78

The latter kind of political distortion may be more significant
than the former. The influence that an advisory opinion recommending asylum has on an adjudicator to follow the opinion may be
175. See supra note 174. Aleinikoff explains the Cuban anomaly thus: "The claims of
most of the 125,000 Cubans who entered during the Mariel boatlift are not being adjudicated. The government is, however, adjudicating claims of persons it would like to

return to Cuba, such as persons who have committed serious crimes in Cuba or in the
United States."
Aleinikoff, Lessons for the United States, supra note 166, at 195 n.45.

176. Laura Dietrich, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for the BHRHA
Asylum Division, explained that most Nicaraguan asylum applicants state facts that simply are not grounds for granting asylum. Dietrich, Political Asylum: Who is Eligible and

Who Is Not (Letter to the Editor), N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1985, at A30, col. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Dietrich, PoliticalAsylum].

One court affirmed the denial of asylum and § 243(h) relief to a Nicaraguan militiaman who had produced a document indicating that he had been confined to quarters
with a warning that he could be confined in the future for insubordination and political
statements. The court questioned whether furture persecution would occur because of
the prior "minimal punishment." Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th
Cir. 1985).
177. See infra note 189 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Lohr, Filipinos: U.S. Bases a

Problem, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1985, at A6, col. 2.
178. Laura Dietrich, however, states:
The Refugee Act of 1980 does not say that political asylum shall be granted to
an individual based on U.S. foreign policy considerations or statements: it does
not say that it be granted based on general conditions of poverty or civil unrest
in the country of nationality; it does not even say that people fleeing communist
governments shall be given asylum.
Dietrich, PoliticalAsylum, supra note 175, at col. 3 (emphasis added).
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greater than that of an opinion recommending denial. By rejecting
an opinion recommending asylum, the adjudicator bears the responsibility of possibly sending a bona fide refugee into the arms of
his persecutor. On the other hand, by rejecting an opinion recommending denial and thereby granting asylum, the adjudicator must
bear only the responsibility of making bad determinations. The
comparatively harmless consequences of deciding against a denial
recommendation most likely make it easier for the adjudicator to
reject this kind of recommendation.
Though the theory that a political bias enters into the asylum
determination is generally supported by the statistics, other nonpolitical factors entering into the decision to apply for asylum
render it impossible to determine the actual significance of a political bias. One important factor is that economic immigrants from
Latin America, including Cuba and Nicaragua, are not considered
refugees under the Protocol. 17 9 The fact that many illegal aliens arrive in the United States because of economic motives may cause the
asylum decisionmakers to presume that applicants from economically depressed countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti are
economic immigrants.' 8 0 Though political, religious, and ethnic
persecution does occur in these countries," a" applicants from these
countries must have particularly convincing claims of persecution to
overcome doubts concerning their motives for wanting to remain in
the United States.' s2 Undoubtedly, many Guatemalan, Salvadoran,

179. See UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 136, at 16, distinguishing economic migrants
from refugees:
A migrant is a person who, for reasons other than those contained in the definition [of a refugee], voluntarily leaves his country in order to take up residence
elsewhere. He may be moved by the desire for change or adventure, or by
family or other reasons of a personal nature. If he is moved exclusively by
economic considerations, he is an economic migrant and not a refugee.
Id.
180. See generally Note, PoliticalLegitimacy in the Law of Political,.sVlum, 99 HARV. L. REv.
450, 458-64 (1985) (arguing that economic deprivation can result from political motives,
thereby negating the distinction between political and economic refugees). Helton, Second-Class Refugees, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1985, at A27, col. 2 (Guatemalans, Salvadorans):
Persecution v. Poverty: Are Haitians Refugees? REP. CENTER PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y-UNIv. MD.,
Spring 1982, at 1, 1.
181. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RI(uITrs PRACTICES FOR 1985, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 542-558 (Jt.Comm. Print 1986) (Guatemala): id. at
514-533 (El Salvador); id. at 571-584 (Haiti).
182. See, e.g., INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 59 n.
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and Haitian applicants have mixed motives for applying for asylum. " ' Since the BHRHA does not assess applicants' claims in a
vacuum, economic factors, along with political considerations, may
distort the success rates of applicants from poor countries.
Another factor complicating the assessment of the impact of
political considerations on advisory opinions is the effect that a particular applicant's immigration status has on an assessment of that
applicant's credibility. For example, if the applicant is illegally present in the United States he or she is less likely to be successful. One
study of asylum adjudications in New York noted:
Whatever a person may allege about the reasons he or she
fears to return, [that person's] credibility is enhanced, diminished or may be utterly lost depending on immigration
status. First, affirmative applications by in-status aliens
have a considerably greater success rate than applications
filed by people who have been apprehended by the INS.
Second, asylum claimants who have entered the country legally are assumed to have greater credibility than those
who have entered illegally-even if the former file
for polit1 84
ical asylum after their legal visas have expired.
Applicants from Haiti, Guatemala, and El Salvador have little
incentive to file affirmatively with a district director, not only because such an action would hasten their deportation, but because it
is very likely that their application would be denied.'8 5 Eastern
Europeans, on the other hand, stand a better chance of securing
asylum status and, thus, have greater incentive to file affirmatively.
Moreover, Eastern Europeans are more likely to have entered legally as tourists or visitors, since their geographic distance from
United States borders all but precludes surreptitious entry. The option of entering legally is foreclosed to Guatemalans, Haitians, and
In sonic cases, different levels of proof are required of different asylum applicants. In other words, certain nationalities appear to benefit from presumptive
status while others do not.
For example, for an El Salvadoran national to receive a favorable advisory
opinion, he or she must have a "classic textbook case."
Id.
183. The government frequently points out that applicants from these countries often
pass through other countries like Mexico without applying for asylum, thus demonstrating their economic motives for coming to the U.S. But this argument fails to distinguish
between the reason for leaving a country and the reason for choosing a particular country in which to apply for asylum. See Aleinikoff, Lessonsfor the 'ired States, supra note 166,
at 231.
184. FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, supra note 21, at 53.
185. Id. at 36; see also TABLE 2, supra note 173.
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El Salvadorans, who are presumed to be economic migrants, and are
routinely denied non-immigrant visas to enter the United States
since they are deemed unlikely to return to their home countries.' 8
A final factor making it difficult to judge the significance of
political considerations in advisory opinions is that applicants must
show that they are victims of individualized persecution rather than
victims of generalized violence affecting the nation as a whole.' 8 7
The requirement that an alien be "singled out" for persecution is a
factor particularly relevant to applicants from El Salvador.' 8 8 Since
many applicants from El Salvador are fleeing generalized violence
and not specific persecution, some of the denials of asylum status
may be the result of this factor and not attributable to political
factors.
Even though there are other factors that play a role in the evaluation of an asylum claim, the possibility that politically oriented
foreign policy considerations are also factored in is disturbing. Not
only is it morally wrong to return an alien to a country where he or
she may face persecution, imprisonment, or even death in order to
further United States foreign policy goals, it is also a direct violation
of an international obligation.1 8 9
It appears to be the input from State Department desk officers
that makes foreign policy considerations a factor. As recently as
1982, one desk officer illustrated the significance of foreign policy
considerations in the formulation of advisory opinions:
[The] United States defense community is convinced that
186. FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, supra note 21, at 53.

187. See Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 359 (BIA 1983):
The type of persecution upon which asylum eligibility may be predicated is not
merely that which threatens life or freedom generally; the Act requires that this
qualifying persecution derive solely on account of one of the five prescribed
grounds in the statute. Generalized oppression by a government of virtually its entire
populace does not come within those specific grounds.
Id. (emphasis added).
188. See, e.g., Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1284-86 (9th Cir. 1985)
("While we have frequently held that general evidence of violence is insufficient to trigger section 243(h)'s prohibition against deportation, not once have we considered a specific threat . . . insufficient because it reflected a general level of violence."); Chavez v.
INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Status as 'young urban male' not specific
enough for political asylum"); Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285, 290 (9th Cir.
1984) ("[O]wnership of a strategically located house... does not qualify as persecution
based on 'race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opinion.' "); Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1982) (general anarchy in El
Salvador insufficient for asylum).
189. See Article 33 of the 1951 Convention incorporated into the 1967 Protocol, supra
note 57.
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we absolutely need military bases in the Philippines.
Therefore, in an asylum claim by a Filipino, chances are
that the desk officer is going to soften the response as
much as possible. As another example, our policy toward
the USSR. Were a State Department desk officer to make a
recommendation in an asylum case contrary to United
States policy toward the origin country at that time, it
would not get very far.' 9 °
The apparently unequal treatment of asylum claims has not
gone unnoticed.' 9 ' The UNHCR noted its disapproval of the treatment of Salvadoran asylum claims, and this disapproval was brought
to the attention of Congress:
The UNHCR should continue to express its concern to the
United States government that its apparent failure to grant
asylum to any significant number of Salvadorans, coupled
with continuing large-scale forcible and voluntary return to
El Salvador, would appear to represent a negation of its
responsibilities assumed upon adherence to the
Protocol. 192
Though the State Department is an important source of information for the BHRHA, the likelihood that State Department information is colored by foreign policy considerations is cause for
concern. The objectivity of information from country desk officers
is especially questionable and should be critically examined for bias.
3. Independent Sources.-In addition to the asylum application
and State Department sources, the BHRHA has access to information from press reports, Amnesty International, the International
Commission of Jurists, UNHCR, and academic publications."' 3
Sometimes information from these sources is submitted along with
an application and is considered then.' 9 4 However, one critic has
190. Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Aaking, supra note 114, at 339 (quoting a State Department desk officer whose name was withheld by request).
191. See, e.g., Davis, Refugees Find a Newv Tormenfor Here, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1985, at 26,
col. 3.
192. 128 CONG. REC. S827 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy. reading UNHCR report dated Sept. 13-18, 1981). See also Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541
F. Supp. 351 (C.D.Cal. 1982) (plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining an injunction against
coercive INS tactics to dissuade filing asylum claims).
193. Bassin Interview, supra note 145.
194. One asylum officer was somewhat critical of some of the information submitted
along with the application, noting that it appears that there is a newspaper clipping service in California that sells articles on conditions in El Salvador 1o immigration attorneys
who then attach them to the application. Id.
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asserted that information from independent sources "is not automatically channeled into the asylum decision-making process.
C. Adequacy of Advisory Opinion
Although the intent behind requiring an advisory opinion is to
shed some light on the genuineness of an individual's asylum
claim,""6 in actual practice the opinions are generally too brief and
97
too conclusory to be of much use to an asylum decisionmaker.
Much of the inadequacy of the opinions probably stems from the
fact that the BHRHA asylum division is understaffed.' g With only
one full-time officer and six part-time officers writing a hundred
opinions a day,' 9 9 there is simply not enough time to read a fourpage application, review supporting documents, research specific
facts, and render a well-reasoned, individual opinion.
To manage the case load the BHRHA has had to streamline the
process. One State Department official said:
After a while the cases all look alike. We've developed a
series of form letters. There is a yes letter and two standard denial letters-one that says no and one that says no
and gives a reason. Other letters deal with specifics of the
countries involved like Poland.2 °°
A few examples of opinions from 1982 will help illustrate the brevity
of these form letters:
195. See Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making, supra note 114, at 335 (quotingJ. Scanlan, Issues Summaries Submitted to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 24
(Sept. 23, 1980)). Time constraints may limit consultation of other sources. See infra
text accompanying notes 197-199.
196. See Matter of Exilus, 18 I. & N. Dec. 276, 279 (BIA 1982) (purpose of admitting
opinions is to "bring forth any information available to the State Department which supports the applicant's claim" and "to indicate the State Department's opinion regarding
the likelihood of persecution given the specificfacts presented by the applicant") (emphasis
added); cf. 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(b) (1985) (enabling an immigration judge to request a second advisory opinion if "circumstances have changed so substantially since the first
opinion was provided [to the district director] that a second referral would materially aid
in adjudicating the asylum request") (emphasis added). See generally Kurzban, Restructuring the
Asylum Process, supra note 166, at 98 (although INS process allows applicant to apply to
the district director and to the immigration judge, BHRHA links both applications to the
State Department's determination of the genuineness of an asylum claim).
197. One INS official commented about the opinions: "They're too generalized. Do
we really need an advisory opinion in each and every case if they're not going to address
the merits of individual claims?"

INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supa note 5, at 63.

198. In March 1985 the asylum division was processing approximately 2,000 claims a
month. Bassin Interview, supra note 145.
199. Id.
200. INS, AsYiM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 58 (quoting State )epartment
official).

1986]

ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS

BHRHA "Yes" Advisory Opinion. Upon careful review of the
information submitted and assuming the facts of this case
as stated in the application are true, it is our view that the
applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to
within the meaning of the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.
BHRHA "No" Advisory Opinion. On the basis of the information submitted, it is our view that the application has not
established a well-founded fear of persecution within the
meaning of the United Nations Convention and Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees upon return to
BHRHA "No (with a reason)" Advisory Opinion. On the basis
of the information submitted, it is our view that the application has not established a well-founded fear of persecution
within the meaing of the United Nations Convention and
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees upon return to
Egypt.
Reason: Although Egypt, according to its Constitution, is
an Islamic state, the Constitution also guarantees freedom
of religious expression and, to the best of our knowledge,
the government adheres to this policy. Christians openly
practice their religion, hold religious services, run schools
and so on. Governmentjobs are open to all without regard
to religion; businesses run by Christians flourish, etc. 2 °'
A recent example of an actual BHRHA "no (with a reason)" advisory opinion indicates little change in style:
Upon careful review of the information submitted, it is our
view that the appellant has failed to establish a wellfounded fear of being persecuted upon return to Nicaragua
within the meaning of the United National [sic] Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees. In our view, the country-wide civil war and the accompanying random violence
which were mainly responsibile for the initial blanket grant
of deferred departure for Nicaraguan nationals no longer
pose the problem they once did regarding the safe return
of Nicaraguans. Most of the Nicaraguans who fled to
neighboring countries as a result of the hostilities have now
returned. We have also noted recent improvements in the
political climate and respect for human rights in
Nicaragua.202

201. Id.
202. Chavarria v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 722 F.2d 666, 667-68 n. 2 (11 th Cir.
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This 1984 advisory opinion could have applied to any Nicaraguan,
underscoring the criticism that advisory opinions are not individualized.2 °3 One BHRHA asylum officer revealed, however, that if an
immigration judge requests more information in a second opinion,
the BHRHA will write a longer, more elaborate opinion.2 " 4
In addition to time constraints, the lack of standard procedures
and uniform guidelines also affects the adequacy of the opinions. "°5
As one BHRHA asylum official explained: "I have no rules, no yardstick . . . it's the totality of the application and the documents ...

present[ed] .... .,206 Though applicants must provide some "objective evidence" to satisfy the objective element of well-foundedness, 2 07 there are no guidelines to help the BHRHA decide how
much "objective evidence" is needed. When the opinion is returned in a brief conclusory form, one is left uncertain as to the
appropriate significance to attach to it. Certainly, the regulations
entitle the applicant to "inspect, explain and rebut"20 8 the findings of
but how does one respond to an unreasoned
the opinion,
20 9
conclusion?
D. Deference Given the Advisory Opinion
In spite of the cursory treatment the BHRHA generally gives to
individual asylum claims, the BHRHA recommendations are usually 2 10 followed by the district directors 21 ' and immigration
1984). See also Chatila v. INS, 770 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1985) (advisory opinion with a
reason that is not specific to the applicant).
203. See, e.g., Scanlan, Who is a Refugee?, supra note 25, at 28; Kurzban, Restructuringthe
Asylum Process, supra note 166, at 98; Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making,supra note 114,
at 341.
204. Bassin Interview, supra note 145. This officer also noted that although the
BHRHA does not have to say why a particular applicant is or is not qualified for asylum
status, the attorneys are unhappy if the opinion does not give reasons.
205. Bassin Deposition I, supra note 117, at 80, 94, 98.
206. Id. at 80.
207. Id. at 64.
208. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.8(d), 208.10(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
209. The lack of individualization further complicates an applicant's ability to "explain and rebut" the opinion.
210. One notable exception was overturned on appeal to a federal circuit court to
conform with the opinion. See Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1984)
(immigration judge denied the asylum application of an El Salvadoran union activist
despite a favorable recommendation from the State Department).
211. Alan Nelson, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, said
that in "most cases" the INS follows the opinions. Deposition of Alan C. Nelson, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service at 21 (Sept. 27, 1983), Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984). District Director
Charles Sava explained:
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judges. -1 - The Ninth Circuit even used an advisory opinion to support its finding that there was substantial evidence to support an
immigration judge's determination of asylum ineligibility.2 " The
fact is that many INS officials consider the advisory opinions dispositive of the applicant's claim. 21 4 One INS official stated flatly, "I
would never, never overrule the State Department. 215 One authority on asylum who interviewed a number of "responsible" INS officials in Washington and Miami after the crush of asylum
applications in 1980 noted that these officials regularly deferred to
the State Department's conclusion. This authority said that these
INS officials "acknowledged that they customarily relied on the 'advisory opinions' received from State in evaluating individual claims.
INS personnel were deluged with work, they explained, and generally not expert about persecutorial conditions overseas. They were
aware of no reason not to rely upon State's greater 'expertise.' "216
It appears that INS officials follow the advisory opinions more out of
deference to State Department expertise than out of respect for the
quality of the opinions.21 7
Though the ultimate decision of whether to grant asylum status

It is hard for me to sit here not knowing what the State Department knows
. .. . In a job like this, you have to realize that you are never going to have all
the information that is available up at State on various matters . . . the interchange among countries diplomacy . . . what all the tradeoffs are ....
FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, supra note 21, at 56 (quoting from interview
with District Director Charles Sava, May 6, 1983).
212. In her survey of New York asylum procedures, Patricia Fagen noted: "In my
reading of printed decisions of asylum cases in the New York Immigration Court, May
1981 -January 1982, I found two cases out of 25 in which an immigrant judge denied a
request despite a favorable recommendation. Both of these were Poles." FAGEN. APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, supra note 21, at 60 n.12. For a discussion of the foreign
policy considerations that may have played a role in favorable recommendaitons to
Poles, see supra notes 166-191 and accompanying text.
213. Chatila v. INS, 770 F.2d at 786, 790 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Finally, the immigration
judge was clearly influenced by the State Department's recommendation against the
grant of asylum.").
214. See generally Asylum Adjudication: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refuge Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 80, 123 (1981).
215. INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 62 (quoting unnamed INS official).
216. Scanlan, Who is a Refugee?, supra note 25, at 30.
217. One INS official said that the advisory opinions are "[t]he most wishy-washy bit
of junk you'll ever read." INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5, at 62 (quoting
unnamed INS official). See also, FAGEN, APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM, s1pra note 21,
at 16 ("For the immigration judges, as for the examinations officers, political judgments
are seen as the domain of the Department of State. Judges do not dispute State Department country expertise, even if they may differ with advisory opinion letters on specific
cases.").
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rests with the district directors and immigration judges, that independence is rarely asserted. In one case, Sotto v. INS, "1 8 the immigration judge had followed the recommendation of the State
Department so blindly that he completely failed to consider persuasive evidence, not available to the State Department when it drafted
its advisory opinion, indicating that the applicant would be subject
to persecution. 2 9 The new evidence consisted of an affidavit of a
retired Philippine Air Force general that described the applicant as
"a rabid anti-Marcos leader" who was placed on a wanted list as an
"opposition leader. ' 22 ' The affidavit said that when the applicant
fled the Philippines, other members of his family were arrested and
that his father had died as a result of physical punishment inflicted
during his detention. 22 ' The affidavit concluded, "It is my honest
opinion that if Mr. Rodolfo Sotto will step in the Philippine soil
again, he will surely be arrested and detained in prison like his father and will be physicially and mentally tortured . . . ."'
The
immigration judge's opinion denying Sotto's asylum claim found
that there was "no evidence to show that he has been actively involved and engaged in such [antigovernment] activity."-2 23 This
finding reflects the advisory opinion's conclusion that "if [Sotto] can
establish he is active in a meaningful way in seeking to overthrow
the Marcos regime [he] would qualify . . . but until such activity is

established, his application does not warrant a favorable finding on
his behalf. ' 224 The similarity between the advisory opinion and the
immigration judge's finding strongly suggested that the advisory
opinion played such a dispositive role in the judge's determination
that the general's affidavit was not even considered.2 2 5
On the other hand, immigration judges who do assert their independence and do not find as the advisory opinion recommends
run the risk of reversal for not giving appropriate deference to the
advisory opinion. This is especially true when the advisory opinion
recommends asylum for an applicant from a country whose nationals rarely receive favorable recommendations. In Zavala-Bonila v.
218. 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984).
219. Id. at 837 n. 3.
220. Id. at 835.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 834 n.l.
225. The circuit court remanded to the BIA "so that it may fully assess Ithe affidaviti
in the context of all the evidence." Id. at 837. The circuit court also suggested that the
Board seek a second advisory opinion. Id. at n. 3.
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INS, 2 26 an immigration judge denied an asylum claim to a Salvadoran union activist though the State Department had recommended
asylum if the applicant's assertions were found to be true.-- 7 The
immigration judge found that the applicant had failed to meet her
burden of proof, and the BIA affirmed.2 2 8 The Ninth Circuit reversed, questioning many of the BIA's conclusions, and stated that
on remand "[t]he BIA should . . .consider, with deference, the State
Department's advisory opinion, particularly in light of the fact . . .
that Salvadoreans rarely receive a State Department opinion supportive of a political asylum application. '"229 In a separate footnote,
the court reasoned:
[T]he BIA's opinion states that the BIA also considered
Zavala-Bonilla's contentions as if they were true. The BIA
nonetheless determined that Zavala-Bonilla did not qualify
for asylum. However, in making this determination, the
BIA failed to consider the State Department's advisory opinion,
which states that Zavala-Bonilla qualifies for asylum if her
allegations are true. The BIA's only reason for initially disregarding the advisory opinion was that Zavala-Bonilla was
not credible. Once the BIA assumed that Zavala-Bonilla's
contentions were true, the advisory opinion should certainly have been considered.2 3 °
One can interpret Zavala-Bonilla as requiring asylum adjudicators to consider the advisory opinions fully, for they risk reversal if
their decision is inconsistent with the opinion under a substantial
evidence theory. Or one can interpret Zavala-Bonilla a bit more narrowly. The case may simply stand for the proposition that advisory
opinions can offer valuable and probative information regarding the
merits of an asylum claim and should not be ignored without comment. In other words, the asylum adjudicator should consider the
opinions with some deference.
Such deferential treatment raises interesting due process issues
since the opinions are to be made part of the record like other evidence presented by the INS and the applicant. 2 1 Traditional due
process requirements outside of the immigration context afford a

226.
227.
228.
claims
229.
230.
231.

730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 563.
Id. The BIA had discounted letters from the applicant's friends supporting her
as being "gratuitous and non-specific." Id.
Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
Id. at 566-67 n.5 (emphasis added).
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.8(d), 208.10(b)(c) (1985).
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party the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.2 32 However, an asylum applicant may not cross-examine the
author of an advisory opinion as to the basis of the opinion. The
BIA in Matter of Exilus 23 3 found that denying an applicant the opportunity to submit interrogatories to the State Department was not
violative of due process.23 " The Board stated that such a submission
would not "measurably improve" an applicant's claim and emphasized the administrative difficulties that submissions of interrogato2 35
ries would entail:

[W]e are not unmindful of the potential effect that submission of interrogatories would have on the already heavy
workload under which the State Department now labors. It
is clear that this would also excessively prolong exclusion
proceedings involving asylum claims. Balancing the significant impact that submission of interrogatories would be
likely to have on the efficient functioning of the government against the minimal benefit that an asylum applicant
may reap, we conclude that no denial of due process results
from the absence of interrogatories. 3 6
The court appears to be applying the Supreme Court's balancing of interests approach to due process analysis found in Mathews v.
Eldridge.2 7 However, though the governmental interest in minimizing administrative burdens is significant, the applicant's interest in
232. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right. . . to be confronted with witnesses against him."). Though deportation and
exclusion proceedings have traditionally been characterized as "civil" in nature, thereby
making the constitutionally protected criminal procedures inapplicable, Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1883), fifth amendment due process in certain administrative proceedings has been held to include the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-270 (1970) (welfare recipients entitled
to confront and cross-examine government witnesses before their benefits are terminated). See also Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 469 (1959), in which the Court stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual,
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence
used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that
he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
233. 18 I. & N. Dec. 276 (BIA 1982).
234. Id. at 280.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any of additional or
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remaining in the United States and avoiding persecution is equally
weighty. Moreover, given the great deference adjudicators give to

the advisory opinions, the risk that a poorly founded advisory opinion will deprive an applicant of his or her chance to remain is great.
Affording an applicant an opportunity to question the author of the
advisory opinion appears to be of sufficient value to be required
under the Mathews analysis.2"' In immigration cases, however, when
the Mathews balancing analysis "gives greater weight to the govern-

mental interest than to the interest of the private party, the process
can lead to a new species of absolution in which whatever sort of
process the government grants will be deemed 'due.'"239
E. Advisory Opinions and Section 243(h) Withholding
Before the Refugee Act of 1980 established an asylum procedure under section 208(a), u4 ° which requires district directors by
regulation to request an advisory opinion,2 4 ' INS would occasionally seek advisory opinions for the then discretionary section 243(h)
relief from deportation.1 42 In 1968 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made this observation about the advisory opinions:
Such letters from the State Department do not carry the
guarantees of reliability which the law demands of admissible evidence. A frank, but official, discussion of the political shortcomings of a friendly nation is not always
compatible with the high duty to maintain advantageous
diplomatic relations with nations throughout the world.
The traditional foundation required of expert testimony is
lacking; nor can official position be said to supply an acceptable substitute. No hearing officer or court has the
means to know the diplomatic necessities of the moment,
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id.
238. See generally Scanlan, Aslylhm Adjudication: Some Due Process Implications of Proposed
Immigration Legislation, 44 U. Pr-r. L. REv. 261 (1983) (discussing the due process aspects
of asylum determination and review as proposed in the House and Senate versions of
the Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1981).
239. Id. at 267.
240. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
241. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1985); see also supra notes 109-118 and accompanying text.
242. Before 1980 the State Department only reviewed politically sensitive or difficult
asylum applications. One State Department official would like to return to that procedure. INS, ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS, supra note 5,at 60.
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in light of which the statements must be weighed. -43
In spite of the court's sentiments regarding the competency of
the advisory opinions, later that same year the Ninth Circuit in Hosseinmardi v. ITS 2 4 4 suggested that the admissibility of advisory opinions was proper as long as the courts reach their own conclusions as
to the merits of an asylum claim and do not rely solely on the advisory opinion. The court said, "The generalities regarding conditions in [the foreign country] which appear in the letter were
severely challenged by petitioner's expert witness. It might well
have been improper had the Board given substantial weight to those
generalities without corroboration or further inquiry." 2'4 5
In 1976 in Zamora v. INS, 24 6 the Second Circuit declined to reverse an asylum denial, noting that the admission of a State Department advisory opinion was not improper, since the applicant failed
to "show some likelihood that it influenced the result.

'24 7

In dicta,

however, the court asserted that though the State Department has
an advisory role to play in the asylum process, it should not be determinative of individual cases. Judge Friendly wrote:
The obvious source of information on general conditions
in the foreign country is the Department of State ...
While there is undoubted truth in the observation [that
there is] some likelihood of the Department's tempering the wind in
comments concerning the internal affairs of a foreign nation, it is
usually the best available source of information .

.

.

. We

therefore see no bar to the admissibility of statements of
the Department of State . . . [regarding] the extent to

which the nation of prospective deportation engages in
"persecution"

.

. .

and [that] reveal, so far as feasible, the

basis for the views expressed, but do not attempt to apply
248
this knowledge to the particular case ....
The court based this position on the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts, continuing:

243. Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677 n.1 (9th Cir. 1968).
244. 405 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1968).
245. Id. at 28. See also Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding a
denial of asylum though the State Department opinion erroneously stated an applicant's
claim, and noting that the applicant's objections to the opinion "might be persuasive if it
appeared from the record that [the opinion] influenced the decision of the Immigration
Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals").
246. 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1976).
247. Id. at 1063.
248. Id. at 1062 (emphasis added).
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The difficulty with introducing [State Department] letters into hearings under Section 243(h) is that they do both
too little and too much. The ones in these cases and others that
we have seen give little or nothing in the way of useful information
about the conditions in the foreign country. What they do is to
recommend how the district director should decide the
particular petitioner's request for asylum. When these letters are introduced into the Section 243(h) inquiry, they
present [the State Department's] conclusion as to an adjudicative fact, based . . . solely on the alien's own state-

ments and phrased in the very language of the Section
243(h) standard. Adjudication in the withholding process
is, however, the task of the [immigration judge] and the
Board of Immigration Appeals. Particularly in light of the
difficulties confronting the alien in proving his case, there is
a risk that
such communications will carry a weight they do not
2 49
deserve.

Recently, in Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith,2 5 ° the
District Court for the District of Columbia downplayed the significance of Zamora and expressed a contrary opinion regarding the appropriateness of the State Department input, stating: "[T]he
advisory opinion process is reasonable and proper, and in no way
'tainted.' The opinions are issued by a sufficiently trained and
guided official, there is adequate expertise available, and each application receives a reasonable period of review related to the amount
of information the application provides." 2 5
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS2 52 cited Zamora with approval and cautioned
the INS against considering individual-specific advisory opinions in
section 243(h) withholding hearings. 2 53 The court noted that
although advisory opinions must be considered when determining
section 208(a) asylum claims, there is no provision for considering
such opinions in the section 243(h) context. The court emphasized
that the factors to be considered for each of these forms of relief is
somewhat different and reiterated the Zamora court's caution that
admitting "these same advisory opinions in a Section 243(h) hearing
presents the 'risk that such communications will carry a weight they
do not deserve' and thus impair the fairness of the hearing when the
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 1062-63 (emphasis added).
594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984).
Id. at 514.
743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 570, 576.
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State Department opinion suggests the outcome of a particular
case."- 25 4 The court suggested that immigration judges make the
section 208(a) asylum decision at a separate hearing from the section 243(h) withholding decision, and if holding two separate hearings is impractical, make separate administrative records upon
which each decision was made. 5 5
Given the fact that there are currently only fifty-five immigration judges deciding all immigration issues, it is unlikely that judicial
resources will be expended to afford an asylum applicant two separate hearings. Moreover, considering the great deference that immigration judges give the advisory opinions in section 208(a)
claims,256 it appears equally unlikely that immigration judges would
reach a section 243(h) decision independent of the BHRHA's
opinion.
The introduction of advisory opinions into the section 243(h)
decision process raises the broader issue of whether the United
States intends to uphold its obligations under the Protocol not to
return refugees. 2 5 7 Congress, in passing the Refugee Act of 1980,
clearly intended to fulfill its obligations under the Protocol by making section 243(h) relief mandatory for those qualifying as refugees.2 58 Though a refugee under the Protocol is defined in
politically neutral language,2 5 9 the current use of State Department
advisory opinions introduces political considerations into the refugee status determination.2 60 Foreign policy considerations simply
should not be factors in determining whether a particular individual
is a refugee.
To allow political factors to influence the decisionmaking process violates not only international law, but domestic federal law as
well. Though courts "cannot interfere with political decisions which
the United States as a sovereign nation chooses to make in the interpretation, enforcement, or rejection of treaty commitments which
affect immigration," '26 ' the courts cannot permit a practice that

254. Id. at 576.
255. Id. at 570.
256. See supra notes 210-239 and accompanying text.
257. Protocol, supra note 12, art. 33. For text of article 33, see supra note 57.
258. See supra notes 57 & 59.
259. For definition, see supra text accompanying note 35.
260. BHRHA consultations with State Department country desk officers is the most
obvious source of political input. See supra notes 166-189 and accompanying text.
261. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1581 (S.D. TFex. 1985) (refusing to
dismiss an indictment of a defendant charged with unlawfully transporting unclocumented aliens since it is up to the Attorney General, and not a private citizen, to decide
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clearly frustrates the congressional intent behind the 1980 amendments. Ignoring the effect that the United States accession to the
Protocol in 1968 had upon domestic immigration law, the 1980 Refugee Act provides an independent basis upon which to challenge
the current procedure. The statutory definition of a refugee found
in section 101(a)(42)(A)2 62 mirrors the Protocol definition. This reflection was intentional. 26 ' Therefore, if the statute does not permit
political factors to enter into the refugee status decisionmaking process, it should be impermissible to admit these factors through the
back door by regulation.2 6 4
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND

PRESCRIPTIONS

Much can be done to improve the asylum process without drastically changing current procedure. First, a reduction in the number
of frivolous claims would reduce both the pressure to deal with the
current backlogs, by resolving claims expediently, and the skepticism that prejudices those who apply for asylum after deportation or
exclusion proceedings have been initiated.2 6 5 Many believe this reduction could be achieved if the proposed amnesty for undocumented aliens is passed by Congress. Strict penalties for attorneys
who abuse the asylum procedure simply to buy their clients more
time should be enforced in order to reduce the number of meritless
applications filed by aliens acting upon advice of counsel. Disciplinary proceedings could be instituted against an abusing attorney after a complaint is filed by the INS or an immigration judge alleging
three instances of clearly meritless applications filed by that attorney. Applicants should be required to get their signature notarized
to impress upon them the seriousness of the application. Strict
penalities should be enforced against those applicants who lie on
the application, and applicants should be specifically apprised of
what those penalties are before they begin filling out the
application.2 6 6
who is a refugee); cf. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (emphasizing the political
nature of immigration laws); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
262. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982). For text of definition,
see supra note 53.
263. See supra note 54.
264. The INA does not require BHRHA advisory opinions. The advisory opinions
enter the asylum adjudication process by regulation only. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7,
208.10(b) (1985).
265. Some of the many asylum applicants who have filed in Miami have denied any
persecution and admit that they came to the United States to work.
266. The current application requires the applicant to sign under a general warning
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Second, the application itself should be improved. The responses elicited from the application are of paramount importance
since they are the BHRHA's primary source of information. The
questions relating to an applicant's "well-founded fear of persecution" should be more elaborate and placed at the beginning. The
space for answering these questions should be enlarged to encourage applications to explain in greater detail the basis upon
which they seek asylum. The application should stress the importance of documentation and should list examples of the types of
documents considered most useful.
Third, the application should be filled out under the supervision of an interviewer trained in refugee law. It should be stressed
that the interviewer's role would be to serve the alien and is separate
from the other enforcement functions of the INS. The assistance of
a trained interviewer is especially important for applications filed
with an immigration judge since these applications have been notoriously incomplete. 6 7 Finally, detailed guidelines for properly interviewing an asylum applicant should be distributed to every
regional office to promote uniformity of quality.
Reforming the BHRHA decisionmaking process could greatly
improve the usefulness of State Department information and reduce
the impact of foreign policy considerations on asylum decisions.
The first step toward reforming the process would be to create comprehensive guidelines that clearly spell out the procedure for compiling information relevant to a particular alien's application.
BHRHA consultations with the highly political country desk officers
would be limited to memos detailing a country's general human
rights practices or to memos on particular asylum applications. This
would reduce the likelihood of foreign policy considerations influencing the BHRHA's opinion. Finally, greater reliance on independent sources of human rights information such as Amnesty
International, the International Commission ofJurists, and press reports would dilute the influence of State Department foreign policy
considerations.
Some commentators believe that the BHRHA should cease rendering "individualized" opinions. Ira Kurzban, an immigration attorney, argues that leaving the decision of whether to render an
opinion to State Department discretion would speed up the asylum

that states: "Under penalties of perjury, I declare that the above and all accompanying
documents are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief."
267. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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process and, at the same time, utilize the State Department's resources when necessary.2 68 John Scanlan, of the Center for Civil
and Human Rights at Notre Dame Law School, suggests that
26
BHRHA and State Department input be eliminated altogether. 9'
Rather than have individual findings, Scanlan proposes the establishment of an "Asylum Advisory Board," independent of the State
Department, to generate human rights "profiles. '27" An alien complying with these profiles would be rebuttably presumed to be eligible for asylum.
The proposed profile system is not without its critics. One
State Department official believes that a profile system ignores not
only the need for individual
consideration, but could lead to the filing of frivolous claims. 2 7 ' This official argues that potential applicants will break the code quickly as to what type of refugee qualifies
for the special presumption under a general profile. This would encourage not only those who meet the profile to emigrate though
they have not been persecuted, but would encourage others to lie
and tailor their applications to fit one of the profiles.
Immigration textbook author and University of Michigan law
professor T. Alexander Aleinikoff proposes the creation of an independent federal agency for adjudicating asylum claims and the
elimination of the State Department's advisory role altogether.2 7 2
After an intensive study of the French and West German asylum
processes, Aleinikoff concludes that an independent asylum adjudicating agency would develop its own expertise and therefore be less
reliant on the State Department. 273 Under his proposal, the State
Department would be a source of information on conditions in
other countries and not the decisionmaker.2 74
Arthur Helton, director of the Political Asylum Project for the
Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, believes that
the State Department should stop issuing opinions that go to the
ultimate issue, but should, instead, simply provide information on

268. Kurzban, Restructuring the Asylum Process, supra note 167, at 91, 111.
269. See Scanlan, Who is a Refugee?, supra note 25, at 36; Scanlan, Regulating the Refugee
Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW.
618, 637-38 (1981).
270. Scanlan, Who is a Refugee?, supra note 25, at 36.
271. Bassin Interview, supra note 145.
272. Aleinikoff, Lessons for the United States, supra note 166, at 183, 235-36.
273. Id. at 236.
274. Id.
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conditions in individual countries to the adjudicators. 27 5 This is
perhaps the best middle ground between general group profiles and
conclusory individual opinions.
The current system produces opinions that are both too general and too specific. Some individualization is necessary to better
assess the merits of an individual claim. The typical opinion, however, consists of a simple conclusion that a particular individual has
or has not demonstrated a "well-founded fear of persecution" along
with a brief discussion of the general conditions of the applicant's
home country. The law generally disfavors the introduction of legal
conclusions on the ultimate issue into evidence. 2 76 Therefore, the
BHRHA should cease issuing opinions concluding whether a particular alien has or has not established a "well-founded fear of persecution" since such a dispositive finding rests with the adjudicator,
not the BHRHA.
Instead, the opinions should discuss the degree of persecution
a particular group faces in a particular country; then the opinion
should discuss the likelihood that a particular applicant would be
persecuted. This would inform the adjudicator without usurping his
or her power to decide the ultimate issue.
Changing the way in which advisory opinions are produced and
presented to asylum adjudicators, along with modifying the application procedure, would be an uncomplicated, inexpensive way of improving the current system. Reducing the input of State
Department desk officers and increasing the input of independent
information sources would greatly reduce the impact of political
considerations on the adjudication process and bring that process
closer to that which was intended under the Protocol and the 1980
Refugee Act. Implementing these recommendations would reduce
the number of frivolous claims, while increasing the quality of investigation and assessment of an individual's fear of persecution.
275. Helton, PoliticalAsylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 MIcH.
J.L. REF. 243, 263 (1984).
276. C.
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